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Internet since its conception has been 
revolutionizing the way people think, do 
business and communicate (FCC, 2013). 
Hostility to the current multistakeholder 
Internet governance model in the geo-
political environment has been a 
significant contributor to the 
reconfiguration of the Internet’s openness. 
A potential result of these tensions is 
Internet fragmentation (Chadwick, 2009; 
BBC, 2005; Arthur, 2012). 
 
Internet fragmentation is a rising concern 
globally mainly due to issues regarding the 
control of the Internet. This topic is being 
discussed at international summits and 
conferences, and a possible fragmentation 
of the Internet is becoming a reality. 
Governments, global businesses and 
other stakeholders have diverse and 
conflicting viewpoints on how the Internet 
should be governed. 
 
The main governing body of the Internet, 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN), has raised 
awareness of this issue in order to protect 
this open source of free flowing 
information. They have commissioned a 
team of students from the University of 
Greenwich in the MA/MBA International 
Business programme to conduct 
exploratory research to understand the 
potential impact of Internet fragmentation 
on the current structure of stakeholder 
authority. 
This project consists of four parts: 
1. An analysis of the social and 
political effects of fragmentation 
2. An analysis of the effects of 
fragmentation on international 
trade through blockmodeling 
3. Internet Fragmentation and its 
influence on global trade through 
interpretive analysis  
4. Assessing the impact of Internet 
fragmentation on international 
business operations.  
 
  
1 .  E XE C U TI VE  
S UM M AR Y  
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1 . 1 .  A n  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  
s o c i a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  
e f f e c t s  o f  
f r a g m e n t a t i o n  
 
The analysis focuses on discourse data in 
social and political forums on the 
phenomenon of Internet governance, 
Internet security, censorship and digital 
inequality. The Internet is a network of 
connected networks and by removing links 
between those networks there is a distinct 
possibility that societies with less 
resources and knowledge will be the main 
losers. The findings show that to a certain 
degree everyone will lose from multiple 
Internets. However developed countries 
are more likely to create solutions around 
Internet fragmentation. With the Internet 
becoming more accessible to new users 
predominantly from the developing world 
their interest need to be considered with 
respect to Internet governance models.  
 
1 . 2 .  A n  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  
f r a g m e n t a t i o n  o n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  
t h r o u g h  
b l o c k m o d e l i n g  
 
Two different processes will be used to 
undertake the simulation. First, business 
network analysis will help to introduce and 
visualise the global offline trading 
networks between countries. Second, 
blockmodeling analysis will help in the 
grouping of countries with similar 
characteristics, providing a deeper insight 
into the trading patterns. Partition vectors 
will be used based on different criteria to 
create the simulation itself. 
 
It can be concluded that the trading links 
among countries will not be affected. In 
the worst case scenario, the current 
trading patterns will stay the same or 
slightly reduce, but will not be eliminated 
totally. USA and Canada and the Eastern 
Asian countries are the main players in the 
network having trade relations with every 
other block, and their links will not have 
changed after applying the vectors. 
English, Chinese, Japanese and Hindi 
languages are central connections that link 
every other group of countries together. 
The findings show that more countries will 
trade with Russia after a possible 
fragmentation.  
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1 . 3 .  I n t e r n e t  
F r a g m e n t a t i o n  a n d  i t s  
i n f l u e n c e  o n  g l o b a l  
t r a d e  t h r o u g h  
i n t e r p r e t i v e  a n a l y s i s   
 
The data derived for this part of the project 
was from elite interviews from senior 
officers in eight governments. Emphasis 
was given to two parts: the countries’ 
preparedness for a fragmented Internet 
and the influence of a new governance 
structure on global trade. 
 
There are ongoing discussions regarding 
the change of the multistakeholder model 
among recognised key players of Internet 
governance, for example Brazil and China. 
However, data collected for this study 
shows that other governments feel that 
Internet fragmentation is unlikely to occur, 
particularly based on countries’ inactions 
in preparation for a fragmentation. 
According to other government officials 
such ‘inaction’ could signal a de-facto 
approval of the current multistakeholder 
model.  
  
However, a different story emerges with 
regard to global trade. Different views 
were expressed that seem to be linked to 
the country level of development. 
Developed countries felt that Internet 
fragmentation would not affect global 
trading links, because economic growth 
and global business would be prioritised 
differently. However, the developing 
countries felt that they would face 
increased challenges in creating and 
maintaining their trading image. Additional 
barriers would lead to increased 
bureaucracy among trading partners 
leading to higher cost. This provides 
additional support to maintaining the 
current multistakeholder approach.  
 
1 . 4 .  A s s e s s i n g  t h e  i m p a c t  
o f  I n t e r n e t  
f r a g m e n t a t i o n  o n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b u s i n e s s  
o p e r a t i o n s   
 
This part of the study used a bottom-up 
approach to identify the relationship 
between subsidiaries and their parent 
companies based on a sample of 
FTSE100 companies. Building on the 
recently developed e-Friction Index (BCG, 
2014), a new model was explored to 
understand the potential vulnerability 
companies would face should 
fragmentation occur. The model is 
comprised of a weighted average 
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calculated using a risk value associated 
with the subsidiaries’ industries, their 
locations and the parent companies’ 
industry. This study also tests the 
hypothesis developed from theoretical 
arguments that multinational companies 
incur greater risk if the Internet fragments 
due to their decentralised functionality and 
a high reliance on the parent company. 
The typologies considered here are 
international, multinational, global and 
transnational. 
 
The findings suggest that global 
companies tend to work in highly complex 
networks and the effects of fragmentation 
have no particular relationship with the 
typology of the company. However, the 
nature of operations and the relationship 
between parent companies and their 
subsidiaries create unique vulnerabilities 
for companies should fragmentation occur.   
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2 .  I N T RO D U C TI ON  
 
In October 1998 in California, US a new 
kind of international organisation was 
established. The Internet Corporation for 
the Assigned Numbers and Names 
(ICANN) had the command to organise 
and regulate ‘the technical protocols of the 
Internet, the Internet address space, the 
Internet domain name system (DNS) and 
the Internet root server system’. With this 
action, an uncommon partnership was 
created between the business world, the 
Internet community (the top decision-
making body) and governments (the 
consultative role) (Kleinwachter and 
Ringgade, 2000). The Internet required a 
new system of governance due to its 
international character. This led to a three-
part effect: an information revolution that 
led to social evolution, and then a new 
quality of political life.  This is despite the 
early opinion by the ‘father’ of the domain 
name system, that the Internet needed no 
formal policy (Jan Postel, as cited by 
Kleinwachter and Ringgade, 2000). 
ICANN has come under increasing 
pressure to reform, due to governments 
wanting more power over the Internet and 
global stakeholders worrying about 
unilateral U.S. oversight (Mueller, 2005). 
The existing multistakeholder model of 
Internet governance aimed to bring 
together primary stakeholders to 
cooperate and participate in dialogue, and 
the decision-making and implementation 
processes to common problems or goals 
(ICANNWiki.com). Therefore, it became 
relatively important for the US to bow to 
international pressure for change and/or 
put forth sustainable ideas for the 
internationalization of Internet governance.   
The Internet Society (2012) believes in the 
creation of appropriate policy frameworks 
that support constant growth and progress 
of the Internet for all. This allows nations 
to adapt the frameworks to their own 
circumstances. If the US and others do not 
take steps to redress some of the recent 
errors in governance, the global 
community could face a deterioration of 
the Internet’s current structure, giving way 
to a fragmented Internet.   
Considering the fact that the Internet 
currently facilitates most global trade, 
Meltzer (2012) argues that there is a need 
for governance interference for the 
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following reason: privacy, property right 
and copyright laws, violence restriction 
and pornography, but also political 
restrictions. 
Having said this, by employing a variety of 
technical and legal tools to block websites 
and platforms and to remove online 
content, governments are not only 
changing the way users connect to and 
participate on the global Internet, but also  
the way Internet actually operates (Hill, 
2012). When it comes to the movement of 
data across borders the question is raised 
as to what data to restrict and how to do 
so appropriately. 
Considering these current issues 
regarding Internet governance, this 
research study aims to critically explore 
the impact of a possible Internet 
fragmentation on social, political and 
economic aspects. The study hopes to 
offer ICANN and the Internet community 
with exploratory research to attain a 
deeper understanding of the impact of 
Internet Fragmentation.  
This study consists of four parts: 
1) An analysis of the social and political 
effects of fragmentation (Janthira Engeset) 
2) An analysis of the effects of 
fragmentation on international trade 
through blockmodeling (Agnes Kovatsova) 
3) Internet Fragmentation and its influence 
on global trade through interpretive 
analysis (Ertina Dyrma) 
4) Assessing the impact of Internet 
fragmentation on international business 
operations (Lakmal Liyanage) 
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3 .  I N TE L L EG E N CE  
G AT H E R E D  
3 . 1  I n t e r n e t  a n d  P o w e r  
Studies show that there have been two 
main changes occurred to the Internet: 1) 
it became vital to social and political 
communication in the real world and global 
profit-making market and 2) radical 
improvements in Internet censorship and 
control technologies (Riley, 2013). The 
Internet Society (2012) highlights some of 
the significant figures regarding Internet 
power such as over 600 Million websites 
and over $600 billion US dollars in annual 
e-commerce. This underlines the notion 
that we now live in a world where 
unprecedented amounts of information 
can be found with ease.  
The end-to-end principle, which allows the 
end-user on the edges of the network to 
connect to other end-user, creates 
networks that are flexible. This means that 
every end-user has the power and 
freedom to exchange and distribute 
information and organise actions over the 
entire network, without any intervention, 
discrimination or authorisations from 
anyone when the project is under 
development and before it reaches other 
users (Bertola, 2010). This principle had 
economic effects on the innovation, and 
might be the reason why the Internet 
succeeded as a medium and a platform.  
The greatest innovation on the network 
has changed how people communicate, 
shop and live, was invented by young 
Internet users and even small businesses 
(Bertola, 2010). These innovations were 
often invented as a tool to make life 
easier. In comparison, the network 
operator was the one who could innovate 
on the telecommunication networks. 
Nonetheless, the Internet has not only 
changed the technological and economic 
landscape, but also society has been 
transformed by the adaptation and the 
changes it has brought (Bertola, 2010). 
It can also be said that the Internet has 
(re)distributed power to their users by 
giving the freedom and ability to do and 
write what they want without any rules that 
imposed by society. Bertola (2010) also 
argues that the end-to-end principle for 
innovation can also be extended to the 
social level. Immediate and low-cost 
access to media across the world has 
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increased the diversity of information and 
the opportunities for free expression 
enjoyed by global citizens. 
Online businesses have thrived nowadays. 
Mostly recognised for its power of 
capturing the intelligence of users, the 
global Internet and its movement of data 
across borders are due to the aggregation 
of the significant volume of data (Meltzer, 
2012). 
One of Internet’s biggest impacts is seen 
in developing countries, (Meltzer, 2012), 
where most of the 2.5 billion Internet users 
are based. Meltzer (2012) argues that the 
Internet can be seen as an input of data, 
which comes to help the businesses. It 
reduces cost in internationalising. 
Jones and Gapper (2014) state that the 
Internet is under hazard from loss of trust 
by its users and from increasing state 
control. Therefore, they urge for the 
possibility of crafting a new set of 
international laws to protect human rights 
online and ensure Internet stability. On the 
other hand, Mueller (2013) argues that it is 
right for Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa to be concerned with the 
extent to which an increasingly important 
sector of the postmodern economy seems 
suddenly exempt from the classical model 
of national control, but it should not be 
seen as an excuse for the sovereignty. 
This ‘cold war’ calls attention to the great 
powers’ scope of traditional arguments 
about control and expansion of their 
terrain/sovereignty and their commercial 
and hi-tech interdependence. 
The UK’s Guardian Newspaper (2013) 
argues that Internet fragmentation will 
bring about an inconsistent de-
globalisation of the world, as ‘roads’ within 
state boundaries become gradually 
restricted, particularly among 
governmental bodies and large domestic 
firms. Two active interest groups, among 
others, argue the following on the topic of 
Internet governance: the one who support 
governmental bodies to play a bigger and 
more direct role in managing Internet 
activity and the other who fear the change 
of the Internet as it is. Therefore, it is 
important to understand these bodies role 
in the intricate system of Internet 
governance in framework, not in 
segregation (Riley, 2013).  
3 . 2  G e o p o l i t i c s  
Geopolitics plays a key role in the 
determination of the Internet governance 
future. Geopolitics refers to the condition 
of a region or government determined by 
the combination of geographical and 
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politics factors (Brzeziński, 1986) with an 
emphasis of geography on politics.  
Badkar (2012) writes about issues related 
to geopolitics which are gaining 
awareness globally. The open Internet is 
at risk of fragmentation as some 
governments and organisations are 
pushing towards regional governance. 
This will ultimately result in a highly 
restricted Internet based on user location. 
The Internet will then be even more 
influenced by certain geopolitical 
objections. 
To have a proper debate on how much 
governments should be able to see of 
communities online behaviour, it is 
important to notice that many things are 
legal for private parties but not for the 
government; for example it is acceptable 
for Google to contract browser ads based 
on user information, but not to pass that 
information on to third party (The 
Economist, 2013).   
Users of the Internet are inherently 
affected by some level of censorship 
(Schmidt and Cohen, 2013) due to 
geopolitical reasons, ranging from national 
security to economy to the country’s 
culture (Deibert, 2009). An extreme 
scenario is the Chinese firewall which 
essentially only permits government 
authorised websites to be visited when 
connecting from inside of China. In China, 
all dataflow on the Internet is monitored, 
censored and manipulated in accordance 
to government needs. 
While the western world attempts to 
distribute the authority and control of the 
World Wide Web and move towards a 
multistakeholder approach, there have 
been occasions where governments have 
decided to completely take countries off 
the Internet map. For example, Egypt was 
a country that completely controlled 
access to all of its population through the 
Internet (Dibbell, 2012). Even though the 
top level of Internet governance follows 
the multistakeholder approach, given the 
geo-political pressures and government 
laws within countries the Internet is under 
severe risk of fragmentation. National 
governments possess the right to block 
and remove content, which is hosted 
within the boundaries of their country 
(Schroeder, 2009). If the webpage is 
hosted outside the country then access to 
those websites is blocked through the 
DNS resolution process (DeNardis, 2014). 
Google, Yahoo, Microsoft and Facebook 
are among the few companies to disclose 
government requests to remove content 
with the use of transparency reports 
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(Ackerman, 2014). They contain detailed 
information on the details of request from 
various governments, copyright owners to 
remove content as well as information 
request about users (Kahn, 2014; Galperin 
and York, 2013) 
In the process of Internet governance, 
there is a need for a multistakeholder 
approach or what DeNardis and Raymond 
(2013) simply calls multistakeholderism as 
well as centralised governing. As an 
example, the DNS resolution is carried out 
through a centralised body in order to 
ensure global uniqueness of web 
addresses and sovereignty of the Internet. 
Discussions regarding technical 
standardisation and inter-operability 
should be carried out through a 
multistakeholder model. Hence, global 
coordination is essential for continuity and 
a ‘global’ operation of the Internet. 
This concept of multistakeholder could 
also be used to prevent the ongoing battle 
of state vs the Internet (Travis, 2013). 
However, repressive governments can 
also use this as a scapegoat in order to 
gain additional power by the limiting the 
participation of non-governmental actors in 
formal debates and not allowing them any 
meaningful power. DeNardis and 
Raymond (2013) suggest that this method 
advocates a more top-down formalised 
multilateral approach rather than one of 
multistakeholderism. 
3 . 2 . 1  I n t e r n e t  G o v e r n a n c e  
‘Internet governance is the development 
and application by Governments, the 
private sector and civil society, in their 
respective roles, of shared principles, 
norms, rules, decision-making procedures, 
and programs that shape the evolution 
and use of the Internet.’ 
- Working Group of Internet Governance 
as cited by Drake, 2005 
The Internet governance rests upon 
multiple key layers which are not visible to 
the end users. The key players in this 
activity include organisations such as 
ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers), IANA (Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority), IETF 
(Internet Engineering Task Force), IGF 
(Internet Governance Forum), ISOC 
(Internet Society)  and IRTF (Internet 
Research Task Force) and W3C (World 
Wide Web Consortium). These 
organisations were initiated in the US as a 
direct result of the need for governance. 
The primary aim of these organisations 
was to keep the Internet open and free. 
Due to the facilitative nature of these 
organisations they are hidden from the 
general online population. However due to 
popularity of the Internet globally and the 
events that have occurred in the recent 
past there has been heavy scrutiny over 
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the US centric nature of Internet 
governance and organisations related to 
governance (Traynor, 2014). Hence the 
transition to a more realistic 
multistakeholder approach has been taken 
and the US government has released its 
control over IANA functions allowing 
ICANN 18 months to devise a smooth 
transition for a multistakeholder approach.  
The Internet is currently governed by a 
multistakeholder agreement managed by 
ICANN, based in the USA. The 
policymaking process is currently taking 
place as an open to all the participants of 
the Internet method. However, the US 
government enjoys a unique influence on 
the governance of the Internet by shaping 
ICANN’s activities though the National 
Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) (Kruger, 2013). 
All governmentsaim for Internet power 
either for political or economic motives. 
However, recently (2013) a potential 
debate is taking over most of the countries 
for Internet governance, potentially leading 
to one thing: Internet balkanisation. 
Meinrath (2013) stated that the U.S. 
government using Internet control power 
to conduct surveillance on the Brazilian 
president Rousseff’s email and ‘spying’ on 
the country’s national oil company has 
created complications for the governance 
of the Internet. 
Other authors suggest that United States 
intervention in to governing of the Internet 
has raised issues over that recent past. 
This is one reason that countries like 
Russia and China have demanded for 
their own closed Internet. 
On October 2010 during the 
Plenipotentiary Conference hosted by the 
United Nations International 
Telecommunication Union, most countries 
suggested for a system regulated by 
international law and not the law of 
California (Negron, 2012). ITU proposed 
the creation of an IP-address-registry 
within the ITU, but it was rejected by some 
western industrial countries who preferred 
the ICANN Governmental Advisory 
Committee (GAC). The lack of a united 
governance scheme for the DNS and the 
voiced divergence between some of the 
major Internet stakeholders open the 
opportunity for changes in the Internet 
governance structure (Negron, 2012). 
There are two predominant issues: 
security and financial preparations. Also, it 
is difficult to manage a borderless Internet 
without international co-operation and 
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agreement. Conversely, consensus for the 
Internet as a paradigm for free and open 
communications could be built through 
international co-operation and agreement 
(Hill, 2014). Considering this, some 
stakeholders call for the ITU to take 
responsibilities and establish balance 
between its members.  
3 . 2 . 2  D e m o c r a c y   
From a socio-technological perspective, 
the Internet is perhaps the innovation that 
has been most extensively associated with 
democracy (Dutton, 2013). In other words, 
the Internet has open up new channels 
and new ways of delivering the message, 
as well as political participation and 
collective action. Margetts (2013) argues 
that evidence have suggested that use of 
the Internet for ‘non-political purposes is 
actually generating new forms of political 
participation’. These channels have made 
it easier to engage and reshape the 
ecology of interest groups as well as 
creating new organisational forms. Even 
though, this might be ideal and make more 
difference in the authoritarian regimes. 
‘We use Facebook to schedule the 
protests, Twitter to coordinate, and 
YouTube to tell the world’ 
- Anonymous Cairo Activist Chebib and 
Sohail, 2011 
As an example, The Arab Spring uprising 
in 2011, where several mass 
demonstrations broke out in numerous 
regimes, started with the Tunisian uprising 
in December 2010, and proliferated across 
the region, leading to similar revolts in 
other Arab nations such as Libya, Egypt, 
Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. Allaguli and 
Kuebler (2011) have looked into the 
revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt, due to 
the fact that both revolutions happened 
nearly simultaneously, and found that both 
shared similarities regarding the 
communication technologies when 
shaping the outcome of the uprisings. 
During the uprising in Tunisia and Egypt 
the world witnessed a new genre of 
revolution. The revolution was organised 
with technology, networks and particularly 
social networks, which played an 
important informational and organisational 
role (Allagui and Kuebler, 2011). Therefore 
the revolutions in both Tunisia and Egypt 
demonstrated the power of networks 
Allagui and Kuebler (2011). The Jasmine 
Revolution in Tunisia lasted for 28 days, 
while the Egyptian Revolution lasted for 18 
days (Chebib and Sohail, 2011). The 
power that social media had during this 
time was incredible and helped the 
revolution to succeed in a shorter time 
T h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  G r e e n w i c h ,  B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l  1 7  
period then it would have twenty years 
ago. 
As Gladwell (2010) argues, social media 
could not be considered as necessary or a 
cause for revolution to take place, but it 
does play a major role, because it extends 
the social networks and makes them more 
significant. The social media was not 
created with intentions to start revolutions 
and ousting dictators, but their products 
have been important tools of Green 
Movements. The Arab Spring shows how 
important the Internet is for democracy 
and the development of society. 
 
 
 
 
3 . 3  D i g i t a l  D i v i d e /  
I n e q u a l i t y  
After the diffusion of Internet users and the 
network itself, research shows that the 
unequal coverage of the Internet has 
suggested a more complicated picture 
about who is most likely to benefit from the 
mediums diffusion (Dutton, 2013, p. 129). 
It is therefore essential to point out the 
digital inequality, and how important it is to 
consider the implications of differentiated 
use for people’s social status and mobility. 
Manuel Castells (2001, p. 248) defines 
digital divide as ‘Inequality of access to the 
Internet’. Moreover, access to the Internet 
can be ‘a requisite for overcoming 
inequality in a society whose dominant 
functions and social groups are 
increasingly organized around the Internet’ 
(Castells, 2001, p. 248). Pippa Norris 
describes it as ‘any and every disparity 
within the online community’ (Norris, 2001, 
p. 4). 
A diversity of opinions can be made for 
network neutrality, highly including the 
claim that the transparency of the Internet 
enables innovation (Solum, 2009), 
coordinated with government regulation of 
network neutrality at the national level. In 
addition, because of the costs of a loss of 
global Internet transparency are invisible 
and difficult to estimate, the prospects for 
an international agreement that 
guarantees the future transparency of the 
global Internet seem dim at best. 
According to Anderson (1995) social 
scientists and policy makers started to 
worry about the inequality of Internet 
access as early as in 1995, even though, 
only three per cent of the American’s had 
barely used the World Wide Web 
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(DiMaggio et al., 2004).  As the technology 
developed and spread, observers noted 
some people used more Internet than 
others, as well as those with higher 
Internet access also had better access to 
education, income and resources 
(Hoffman and Novak, 1998). The concern 
about the new technology might make 
inequality worse rather than improve it. 
The term ‘Digital Divide’ was then created.  
Former Secretary-General of the United 
Nations Kofi Annan has referred to ‘Digital 
Divide’ as: ‘The new information and 
communications technologies are among 
the driving forces of globalization. They 
are bringing people together, and bringing 
decision makers unprecedented new tools 
for development. At the same time, 
however, the gap between information 
‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ is widening, and 
there is a real danger that the world’s poor 
will be excluded from the emerging 
knowledge-based global economy’ 
(Annan, 2002). 
According to Hargattai and Hsieh (2013), 
researchers started noticing that 
international inequality had spread already 
in the early 1990s, as well as finding out 
that the developed nations were achieving 
higher rates of diffusion than less-
developed nations (Guillén and Suárez, 
2005). 
In 1999, The United Nation Development 
program published a report arguing that 
the productivity gained from information 
technologies might enlarge the gap 
between the developed nations and the 
less-developed nations, which has less 
skills, infrastructure and resources to 
invest in the new technology and 
information society:   
‘The network society is creating parallel 
communication systems: one for those 
with income, education and literally 
connections, giving plentiful information at 
low cost and high speed; the other for 
those without connections blocked by high 
barriers of time, cost and uncertainty and 
dependent upon information’ (Norris, 
2001, p. 5; UNDP, 1999, p. 63).  
While Guillén and Suárez (2005) argue 
that ‘democratic political regimes enable a 
faster growth of the Internet than 
authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, 
controlling for economic development and 
income.’ 
Clearly ‘Digital Divide’ is still an important 
topic in 2014, as in 1995 when it started. 
Jan van Dijk argues in his book that ‘most 
likely, the digital divide within developing 
countries and between them and the 
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development world will continue to rise’ 
(van Dijk, 2005, p. 185). However, this 
might be true if the current unequal 
economic and social development of 
global society continues (Fuchs, 2011, p. 
219). 
3 . 4  M u l t i s t a k e h o l d e r  M o d e l  
The ‘multistakeholder model’ is a unique 
model for the Internet; it engages 
technologists, the private sector and the 
civil society ‘in a bottom-up, consensus 
driven approach to standards settings, 
Internet development, and management 
(Shipman Wentworth, 2013). ‘In other 
words, a ‘‘multistakeholder model’ can be 
describes as an organisational framework 
or structure, which is adopting the 
multistakeholder process of 
governance/policy making. According to 
Weber (2009) ICANN is a truly 
multistakeholder, primary because the 
participants represent different interest 
groups. 
Shipman Wentworth (2013) argues that 
this approach has been confirmed to be 
effective when it comes to stability, 
security and the availability of the global 
infrastructure of the Internet. However, the 
sovereign nations still has the opportunity 
and the flexibility to develop their own 
Internet policies inside their borders. On 
the contrary, overall level the 
multistakeholder model is not truly 
democratic (Hill, 2013). Richard Hill 
(2014), argues that the multistakeholder 
model ‘gives more weight to the relatively 
less democratic components, such as 
private companies, as opposed to the 
components who are supposed to be 
relatively more democratic’. As well as 
giving more weight to the interests of 
developed countries (Hill, 2014). 
3 . 5  D N S  F r a g m e n t a t i o n  
Fragmentation can happen on different 
levels, can be technical and social, 
physical and virtual, and on the domain 
name system (DNS) level. The DNS is 
fundamentally a system for planning, 
assigning, and recording domain names, 
by ensuring that the same responses to 
the same demands issued from any place 
on the Internet (Bygrave and Bing, 2009). 
The purpose of the DNS is to guarantee 
that every mass computer leads to an 
exclusive IP address, the failure of which 
leads to instability (Lenard and White, 
2011). 
Domain name system (DNS) level 
fragmentation or in other words logical 
layer Internet fragmentation is one of the 
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most influential forms of Internet 
fragmentation, consisting of breaking up 
the Internet in terms of top-level domain 
names (.com, .gov, etc.) (Hill, 2012). If 
different ‘translating’ systems would 
operate, it might cause disruptions in the 
flow of information, therefore in the flow of 
trade data as well by having unilateral root 
servers (non-English alphabetic general 
top level domains). 
Hill (2012) comprehensively explains 
fragmentation by giving three different 
matrixes, and also analysing the different 
layers at which fragmentation might 
happen. Out of these layers, trade flow is 
also affected, but it is not clear to what 
extent. For instance, the exhaustion of the 
IPv4 numbers, and the growing demand 
towards the IPv6 numbers in the Asian 
and Pacific region is clearly dividing the 
Internet not only in technical terms but 
also, in terms of speed of access. This 
could lead to the disruption in the flow of 
trading.  
Financial Times (2013) state that the 
major fear the NSA (National Security 
Agency in US) is facing the balkanisation 
of the Internet. Brazil has already 
announced plans to promote its own 
networking technology and the EU is 
considering establishing its own data 
cloud. At the same time, the risk that the 
US faces is that the unconstrained power 
of the agency will eventually damage 
America’s Internet companies (Financial 
Times, 2013). 
In the last decade, people interested in 
this topic made suggestions and noted 
different ways in which the Internet will be 
divided into different parts, threatening 
online trade among others. Levels of 
fragmentation can also happen on the 
social level, and as discussed above, 
filtering and censorship might also 
indirectly affect the flow of trade. However, 
to what degree fragmentation will occur in 
the future, or change the interoperability of 
the Internet is hard to predict. 
3 . 6  T r a d e / S o c i a l  C a p i t a l  
International trade between countries acts 
as ties or relations, like relations between 
two individuals therefore social capital can 
be explored in this context. Social capital 
is seen as resources through connections 
whether it is reputation, wealth or even 
power. This concept has been widely 
explored by scholars, which can also be 
transferred and applied to the trading 
network of countries. The exploration of 
strong and weak ties between two trading 
partners, that are importing/exporting to 
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and from each other, can give a fairly good 
reflection about the whole trading network 
of the world in terms of offline trade. There 
are trading ties, for instance between USA 
and Canada or USA and China, that are 
very strong (measured by the import trade 
data). However, ties do exist where trade 
is not significant and carry only a low 
marginal value, for instance trade between 
European countries and African countries 
(Sweden-Togo for instance). These ties 
are affected and influenced by 
fragmentation, the same as multinational 
corporations, societies and the end users. 
It will be interesting to see how 
fragmentation can change the way 
countries trade, as trading might be 
divided, giving space for ‘structural holes’. 
These holes, identified by Burt in 1992, 
have the potential to be filled in, either by 
individuals or by countries, by simply 
starting new trade relationships, therefore 
creating a different structural network 
(Burt, 1995). 
3 . 7  O n l i n e  T r a d e  
Meltzer (2013) writes about the fact that 
governments are restricting the access of 
Internet so that customers have limited 
access to businesses and entrepreneurs. 
In some cases, restrictions may target 
foreign business in order for domestic 
businesses to benefit from these 
restrictions. 
Yewkes and Yar (2010) argue to different 
reasons on why Internet is important in 
trading including the ability on global 
scale, high degree of flexibility, and holds 
massive potential for businesses to 
communicate with and collect information 
regarding their customers and products. 
McKinsey Global Institute (2011, as cited 
by NASDAQ, 2012) demonstrates that, at 
the country level, U.S. saw that an 
increase of both import and export 
resulted in a decrease of the national 
deficit from $43.0 billion in September to 
$40.6 billion in October 2013 (U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 2013), proving 
once more the big influence Internet has 
upon economic development as well. 
Multinational companies are creating 
trading facilities for their customers, such 
as Commerce 3.0 roadmap by eBay, 
which equips consumers and merchants 
through the Internet and technology 
shrinking the world for them by lowering 
trade costs (eBay, 2012). This enables 
small firms to enter international market 
and establish international trade by 
making existing cross-border trade more 
efficient. However, in order for this 
roadmap to function, it is important to take 
consideration of efficient shipping and 
T h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  G r e e n w i c h ,  B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l  2 2  
border mechanisms; global payment 
systems; and technological platforms 
(Ebay, 2012). 
Moreover, information found on the 
Internet can help businesses grow and  
internationalise, by approaching new 
techniques and innovative ideas. UNCTAD 
(2004) suggests that the Internet is useful 
to: ‘(a) communicate more effectively and 
at lower costs and (b) obtain information 
that facilitates transactions’. 
Meltzer (2014a) argues that the Internet 
creates the opportunity for SMEs and for 
businesses in developing countries to 
participate in the global economy. 
However, he does not underestimate the 
hidden barriers: limits on Internet access 
(30% developing countries and 80% 
developed countries); cross-border data 
flow related barriers; market access 
restrictions on selling goods and services 
online and delivering goods purchased 
online associated with rising prices; etc. 
The impact of the Internet on global trade 
is significant through the promotion of 
innovation and productivity growth by 
reducing transactions costs (Meltzer, 
2014a).  it also enables SMEs to compete 
in international market. In this context, a 
survey of 4,800 SMEs in 12 countries finds 
that SMEs utilizing the Internet for 
business functions grew at twice the rate 
of those that did not use Internet as 
platform in their business (Meltzer, 2014). 
This fast-paced environment has shifted 
away from the traditional way of doing 
business to a technological revolution by 
only trading goods that include services; 
leading to trade globalization due to the 
significance of innovation and global 
economic growth (Bailey, 2000). 
Overall, results showed that developing 
countries and emerging economies are no 
longer just users of e-commerce services 
but are also starting to act as providers of 
such services and related e-business 
models. The Internet helps motivate 
exports from poor countries to rich 
countries and it explains some of the 
recent growth in trade. Rather than 
creating new trade, Internet growth simply 
redirects trade toward a given country; if 
the country improves its access to the 
Internet, exports will increase (Clarke and 
Wallsten, 2005). 
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3 . 8  M N E  T y p o l o g y  
A multinational enterprise (MNE) is a 
corporation that owns and/or controls 
production and holds facilities and other 
assets in one or more countries other than 
the home country (Pitelis and Sugden, 
2000). Such companies have offices 
and/or factories in different countries and 
usually have a centralized head office 
where they co-ordinate global 
management.  
The key to understanding such 
corporations is to recognise and evaluate 
the organisational strategies underpinning 
the business itself/ structure employed. 
The most recent and extensive typology of 
MNEs was first proposed by Bartlett and 
Ghoshal in the late 1980s and then later 
revised (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2002), 
dividing MNEs into global, multinational, 
international, and transnational 
corporations.
Table 1- Bartlett and Goshal's Typology 
Typology Attributes Centralisation 
International Import/Export Oriented Centralised only core Functions 
Global 
Invested in many countries, Synchronised brand image 
Minimal local responsiveness 
Centralised Functions 
Multinational Local Operations adopting their product to the local market Decentralised Functionality 
Transnational 
Global Approach 
And efficiency 
Global Approach  
(Most Decentralised) 
International companies are primarily 
importers and exporters; that is they hold no 
investment outside of their home country. 
Such companies are based in one country 
but trade to others. They centralise its core 
functions and decentralise others, adapts its 
strategies to take account of local 
differences and diffuses knowledge to its 
foreign divisions (Harrison, 2013). 
Global companies maintain a presence and 
investments in many countries. They 
promote products through the use of a 
coordinated/synchronised brand image in all 
markets. Generally speaking, there is one 
corporate office that is responsible for global 
strategy thereby resulting in high global 
efficiency (Sambharyaa et al., 2005). This 
centralized strategy results in a higher 
degree of interdependence among 
subsidiaries, with minimal local 
responsiveness; that is the company makes 
few to no adjustments to their products or 
services in accordance with local culture 
and needs (Sambharyaa et al., 2005). The 
main focus of a global company is to 
maintain the management of cost through 
volume and efficiency. They have a 
tendency to be more centralised by 
retaining knowledge and power at the 
company headquarters (Harrison, 2013). 
In both Global and International companies, 
the main market would be set at home. 
Extension to other geographical locations 
would be made only to those markets that 
exhibited similar characteristics to that of 
the company’s home (Mead and Andrews, 
2009). To contrast these two strategies, the 
management of the subsidiary’s and 
marketing policy is controlled more by the 
headquarters in a global company. 
Multinational companies invest in other 
countries but do not coordinate their 
products in each country. Instead, they 
focus on adapting their products or service 
to the individual local market. (e.g. 
McDonald’s/Coca-Cola) In doing so, 
multinational companies manage their 
subsidiaries with a view to local 
responsiveness by making adjustments to 
their products or services to account for 
local differences (Sambharyaa et al., 2005). 
This results in the company operating with a 
number of decentralised subsidiaries, each 
operating in its own area and retaining 
knowledge largely within its own business 
unit, thereby taking advantage of 
differences in markets around the world 
(Harrison, 2013). 
The transnational company evolved in the 
1980s in response to the demands for 
global efficiency, national responsiveness, 
and worldwide learning (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 2002). Transnational companies 
are not identifiable through one particular 
home country. Although they maintain a 
central corporate facility, they allow each 
foreign market to uphold power on decision-
making processes, research and 
development R&D and marketing functions. 
By extending their operations in several 
countries, transnational companies thereby 
sustain a high level of local inclusiveness 
(Harrison, 2013). (eg Nestlé/Unilever) This 
type of company designs a product to be 
globally competitive, and is differentiated 
and adapted to local subsidiaries to meet 
local market demands. Therefore, the 
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transnational strategy places simultaneous 
emphasis on both global efficiency and local 
responsiveness. 
A key aspect between multinational and 
transnational companies is that the former 
company retains strong national 
identifications even though they operate 
around the world (e.g., 
Dell/Honda) (Schermerhorn, 2011). On the 
other hand, transnational companies 
operate worldwide, therefore without being 
identified with one national home.  Such 
transnational companies view the world 
market as its domain for acquiring 
resources, locating production facilities, 
marketing goods and services, and 
establishing brand image. They seek total 
integration of global operations, make 
decisions from a global perspective and 
employ senior executives from many 
different countries (Schermerhorn, 2011). 
An example of a transnational company is 
Nestlé who employ senior executives from 
many countries and try to make decisions 
from a global perspective rather than from 
one centralized headquarters. 
While the multinational company is 
responsive to change at the local level, the 
global company is more efficient at the 
global level, the international company is 
able to influence and disseminate 
knowledge to its local divisions, and the 
transnational company achieves global 
flexibility and competitiveness. Bartlett and 
Ghoshal clearly see the transnational 
company as the most appropriate type of 
MNE in an increasingly globalising world 
(Harrison, 2013).  
Figure 1- Company Strategy according to global and local 
presence 
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4 . 1  A n  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  e f f e c t s  o f  
f r a g m e n t a t i o n   
( J a n t h i r a  E n g e s e t )  
 
4 . 1 . 1  I n t e r n e t  g o v e r n a n c e  
The growth of the Internet, the risks, and the 
rewards it brings has brought the Internet 
governance and cyber security to public 
consciousness. The debate over ‘who 
should govern the Internet’, and ‘should it 
be governed’ is currently a topic many 
countries are focusing on.  How the Internet 
is controlled can interfere with civil liberties, 
such as freedom of expressions and the 
right to privacy. These are again entangled 
with national security and might also affect 
global innovation policy. 
In the recent years there have been several 
incidents that shocked the world, which 
have created several debates regarding 
privacy. There are two very public situations 
related to security and privacy issues. The 
first started in 2006, when WikiLeaks 
released sensitive diplomatic information. 
The second situation took place in 2013, 
when American Edward Snowden released 
numerous NSA documents to two 
journalists. Some of these documents 
uncovered the existence of numerous global 
surveillance programs, which lead to huge 
debates in Europe and elsewhere. Snowden 
is still leaking important confidential 
documents. These incidents have trigged 
nation-states to consider a shift in the 
Internet control. 
‘Our fundamental freedoms and human rights 
are not negotiable and they must be protected 
online. We want to officially anchor the Internet 
governance on principles of freedom’ 
- Neelie Kroes, 2014 
Kroes, the EU’s digital agenda 
commissioner argues against government 
control of the Internet. In February 2014, 
Kroes presented a strategy move calling for 
a ‘clear timeline of the globalisation of 
ICANN’. However, the fact that the EU 
wants ICANN to be more open in order to 
decrease US control is not new, but has 
however been strengthened after the 
disclosure of the illegal US spying activities. 
Kroes claims that the EU move comes at a 
time of ‘broken trust’ caused in part by 
‘large-scale Internet surveillance scandals’, 
and describes the ‘new globalised ICANN’ 
as: ‘we want to make sure that everyone 
has a voice in the debate’ (Daniela, 2014). 
4 .  AN AL Y S I S  O F T H E 
F I N DI NG S  
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On the other hand, Dr. Laura DeNardis 
engages with the question regarding who 
should govern the Internet, is it Google, the 
U.S government or the United Nations? At a 
conference at the Carnegie Council for 
Ethics in International affairs, DeNardis 
argues that there is no simple answer to 
that question due to numerous ‘layers of 
design, administration, and distribution and 
coordination issues.’  
China and Russia have been lobbied for 
stronger control of the Internet and its users 
for a long time. These two nations have 
been working towards shifting the Internet 
control from ICANN to the United Nations, 
where both of the nations has a strong 
position, as well as permanent members of 
the Security Council. 
However, the main reason for the EU wish 
to change the structure of Internet control is 
because these nations have had a hard 
time trusting the US government. China and 
Russia on the other hand wish to shift the 
Internet control from ICANN to the UN to get 
a tighter control on cybercrime, but there is 
reason to believe that the aim is also to 
‘tame’ dissidents who increasingly make 
their anti-establishment voices heard 
through social networks.  However, Kroes 
underlined in her speech that the European 
Commission ‘rejects a United Nations or 
governmental takeover of the Internet 
governance’, as suggested by China and 
Russia’ (Daniela, 2014). The outcome of 
such move could be what many experts call 
‘a balkanisation of the Internet, where the 
Web could lose its global nature and would 
be divided into several regional nets, each 
following different rules’ (Daniela, 2014). At 
this prediction, Kroes claims that ‘we cannot 
allow the Internet to unravel into a series of 
regional and national networks’. In other 
words, the EU digital agenda commissioner 
is against Internet fragmentation.  
The Obama administration has ‘announced 
that the U.S government would relinquish its 
role overseeing Internet addresses in favour 
of a to-be-determined global body’; which 
would allow the Internet to be heavily 
influenced by foreign governments or 
controlled by the United Nations (“U.S. to 
Give Up Key Internet Governance Role,” 
2014). The former President Bill Clinton is 
more sceptical of the Obama 
administration’s plan to relinquish Internet 
oversight authority. At a panel discussion 
sponsored by the Clinton Global Initiative, 
Bill Clinton expressed his concern regarding 
the change of control as: 
‘I understand in theory why we would like to 
have a multistakeholder process. I favor that, I 
just know that a lot of these so-called 
multistakeholders are really governments that 
want to gag people and restrict access to the 
Internet.’ 
Furthermore he says that by giving the 
authority to someone else might work 
against its purpose, and it might rather be 
‘cracking down on Internet freedom and 
limiting it and having governments protect 
their backsides instead of empowering their 
people.’ (“Bill Clinton Would Prefer U.S. 
Oversight of the Internet,” 2014).  
Former Republican House Speaker Newt 
Gingrich, commented on Twitter saying: 
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However, other interest parties feel more 
positive regarding the Obama 
administrations announcement:  
‘We are inviting governments, the private sector, 
civil society, and other Internet organisations 
from the whole world to join us in developing this 
transition process’ 
-Fadi Chehadé  
The president and CEO of ICANN 
The fact that the U.S government is the one 
who ultimately ‘controls’ the Internet is 
something many organisations and nations 
find misplaced, as the Internet is a global 
phenomenon, which many nations’ 
economy has become increasingly 
dependent on, the Internet needs to be 
governed by a different organisational body. 
These findings shows that other nations 
wish to shift Internet control, while former 
President and a former Republican House 
speaker of the US are more skeptical to the 
change of power, due to the fact that 
government will get more control over their 
Internet users, and what information they 
can access. However, the President and 
CEO of ICANN and former member of 
ICANN’s board is far more positive for the 
change. Vint Cerf, Googles Chief Internet 
Evangelist and former member of ICANN’s 
board, believes that moving ‘toward a more 
multistakeholder model of governance 
creates an opportunity to preserve its 
security, stability and openness’; the 
opposite of the former Presidents’ concern.  
The Internet, however, has reached the 
point where it can be described as a ‘living 
organism’, where everyone can access, 
produce and change the content. How a 
future Internet governance structure has to 
take the development and the nature of the 
Internet into consideration. As a network of 
connected networks, a changed structure 
achieved by removing the links between 
those networks might defeat the whole 
concept of having an Internet. Any new 
establishment of Internet control must not 
suppress the innovation and the free and 
open Internet. 
4 . 1 . 2  O p e n  a n d  f r e e  I n t e r n e t  
a n d  c e n s o r s h i p  
The ability to broadly distribute information 
and ideas has been one of the strengths of 
the Internet, and is also one reason why the 
Internet is so important. Internet however, 
has been one of the greatest tools for 
freedom since the printing press. The free 
flow of information and the ability to share 
ideas over the Internet have helped many 
nations to develop. Some dictatorships 
might not have fallen had the social media 
tools such as Twitter and Facebook not 
existed. Take the Arab spring for instance, 
how fast the ideas and thoughts of the 
democracy spread with help of the Internet, 
and how people in Egypt and Libya got in 
contact with each other to get inspiration 
and advice (and planning).  
Internet censorship comes in many forms, 
the government can filter and block certain 
websites to block the dissemination of 
political opinion, blacklist pornography or 
pirate websites. 
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‘Giving up control of ICANN will allow countries 
like China and Russia, that don’t place the same 
value in freedom of speech, to better define how 
the Internet looks and operates.’ 
-One member of US Congress 
Governments are increasingly establishing 
mechanisms to block what they consider to 
be undesirable information. Many 
governments use censorship to target 
content involving child pornography, 
copyright infringement, illegal gambling or 
the incitement of violence. However, the 
number of governments that block access to 
information related to politics, human rights 
and social issues is increasing. From the 
report of Freedom of the Internet 2013, it 
shows that out of 60 countries evaluated, 
‘29 have used blocking to suppress certain 
types of political and social content’.  
Countries like China, Iran and Saudi Arabia 
possess some of the most comprehensive 
blocking and filtering competences and are 
disabling access to thousands of websites. 
Even democratic countries such as South 
Korea and India have blocked numbers of 
websites of a political nature.  
China, Iran and Cuba are among one of the 
most restrictive countries in the world when 
it comes to Internet Freedom. China 
developed technological devices and 
techniques to systematically censor the 
information on the Internet, as well as 
increasing offline pressure and arrests to 
prevent stimulation of free expression 
online. In Iran social media is banned and 
text messages are under surveillance, even 
though a few government officials such as 
the President Hassan Rouhani and the 
Foreign Minister Javad Zarif in Iran embrace 
social media, and use it to connect with the 
West without using traditional media outlets. 
The tweet below however is the President’s 
way of supporting open dialogue over the 
web. The party officials and those who work 
in specific professions in Cuba are the only 
group of people, who are granted the permit 
and trust to access the global Internet. 
‘More users are being arrested, prosecuted, or 
imprisoned for their post on social networks, 
blogs, and websites.’ 
-Kelly et.al. 2013 
(Freedom on the Net) 
Furthermore, instead of simply blocking and 
filtering information that is considered 
undesirable, the numbers of countries that 
are developing new laws that criminalise a 
certain type of political, social and religious 
speech is increasing. Thus, more Internet 
users are being arrested for their post in 
social media. The Freedom of the Internet 
2013 report, states that ‘some governments 
may prefer to institute strict punishments for 
people who post offending content rather 
than actually blocking it, as this allows 
officials to maintain the appearance of a 
free and open Internet while imposing a 
strong incentive for users to practice self-
censorship’ (Kelley et al., 2013, p. 4) 
‘Over the past year, the global number of 
censored websites has increased, while Internet 
users in various countries have been arrested, 
tortured, and killed over the information they 
posted online’ 
-Kelly et.al. 2013 
(Freedom on the Net) 
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Out of 60 countries Freedom of the Net 
2013 has exanimated, ‘the government has 
either obtained more sophisticated 
technology to conduct surveillance, 
increased the scope and number of people 
monitored, or passed a new law giving it 
greater monitoring authority. There is a 
strong suspicion that many of the remaining 
25 countries’ also ‘stepped up their 
surveillance activities, though some may be 
better than others at covering their tracks.’ 
A free and open Internet helps to promote 
innovation and entrepreneurship as well as 
spreading ideas a cross the world.  
Furthermore, it protects the freedom of 
speech and the democracy. Without an 
open and free Internet, governments or big 
cooperation’s would have tight control over 
how people access the global Internet.  
Freedom of information and access to 
information is important for the citizens in 
every country, and everyone should have 
the same right. The right to access, share, 
create and distribute information on the 
Internet. If a potential Internet fragmentation 
happens there are reasons to believe that 
the above mentioned nations will step up 
their level of censorship and punishment 
against free speech. However, there should 
be laws and regulations implemented as a 
guideline, and which respect and promote 
economic growth, creativity, innovation and 
entrepreneurship and free flow of 
information.  
4 . 1 . 3  D i g i t a l  D i v i d e  a n d  
I n e q u a l i t y  
The development of the Internet has 
increased the Digital Divide, by leaving the 
developing countries behind and the 
developed countries rapidly in front. The 
English language dominates the Web, and 
the West dominates  innovation, the impact 
of the digital gap is growing. The digital 
divide is a global issue, just like other 
economic or social problems, and has to be 
taken into treated just as other economic 
and social problems.  
The Internet has affected the economy 
differently than the traditional businesses 
have in the past. Compared to a traditional 
business, where the facility, machines and 
employers had to be based in a physical 
location, the Internet has reduced the 
barriers of people moving around. However, 
by using the Internet as a channel to 
promote and sell, it forces the businesses to 
face an increased global competition, and it 
makes it more difficult for bricks-retailers to 
compete with online retailers. 
‘Building an open, empowering information 
society is a social, economic and, ultimately, 
political challenge’ 
-Kofi Annan, 2003 
By looking at the examples of Sweden and 
Greece, the former with a highly educated 
population and the latter with lower income 
and education levels, only 12% of the 
population of Sweden is offline, compared 
to 56.5% in Greece (“World wakes up to 
digital divide,” 2010).  According to ITU 
analyst, Vanessa Gray, ‘The scale of a 
country’s digital divide reflects the condition 
of its economy’ (“World wakes up to digital 
divide,” 2010). As Kofi Annan expressed, 
the challenge of building an information 
society requires political attention, which 
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again requires that the country has the 
economy to do so. The digital divide may 
therefore be higher in developing world 
where: 
‘200 million more men have access to the 
Internet than women’ 
 -ITU, 2013 
The digital divide in the developing world 
not only concerns economic and social 
differences, but also an ‘Internet gender 
gap’. For example, in developing countries 
the concept of cybercafés have been more 
popular with men than with women, due to 
the fact that men have more freedom and 
the ability to spend money on it than women 
(“Women and ICT in Africa,” 2014). 
‘Women face a variety of barriers to full and 
equal access, including cost, lack of digital 
literacy, lack of awareness of the Internet’s 
potential, and end entrenched cultural and 
gender norms that limit them from forming 
independent connections outside their home or 
community’ 
-Mind the digital gender gap, 2014 
According to the World Pulse statistics, only 
25 percent or less of the online population in 
West Africa and South Asia are women. 
The gap between male and female Internet 
users is relatively small in OECD countries 
compared to the developing world, where 
computers often are reserved for men. As a 
report done by the Broadband commission 
shows, in the sub-Saharan African countries 
only half the numbers of women are 
connected than men 
(broadbandcommission, 2013). In the same 
report, it is estimated that 60 million women 
and girls were online in India, compared to 
80 million male Internet users in mid-2013. 
This supports the argument that men in 
developing countries have more freedom 
and ability to spend money on cybercafés 
than have women. Additionally, women in 
many countries in the developing world are 
already facing barriers such as illiteracy, 
poverty and discrimination while getting 
education. However, these groups of 
women are ignored in many African 
societies. 
‘Many States are not yet proactive in 
implementing broadband development and 
policies that promote the coordination of efforts 
among the public sector, businesses and civil 
society’ 
-APC Woman’s Rights Programme 
Access to the Internet is therefore an 
important tool for women to overcome these 
barriers. Becoming more technologically 
skilled can help women improve their 
education, income and their role in the 
society. Knowledge on how to use 
technology effectively and safely would help 
empowering women in the developing 
world. With an increase in African youth, the 
competition for jobs and better opportunities 
have also increased., By not suppressing 
these issues women’s employability and 
financial independence in African countries 
can be improved (“Women and ICT in 
Africa,” 2014). 
‘Men in West Africa tended to feel threatened 
when women used cell phones and accessed 
the Internet, seeing it as destabilizing to 
relationships and viewed such unsupervised 
activity by woman as inappropriate’ 
-Nancy Hafkin, 2014 
By closing the gap, it is possible to create 
new global opportunities in low and middle-
income countries. By giving the half a billion 
women and girls access to the Internet, 
millions would improve their ability to 
generate income, improve their education, 
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and feel they had  greater freedom as a 
result of being online (Women on the web, 
2012).
 
 
 
4 . 2  A n  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  f r a g m e n t a t i o n  o n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  t h r o u g h  b l o c k m o d e l i n g   
( A g n e s  K o v a t s o v a )  
4 . 2 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
This part will include the results and findings 
from the blockmodeling analysis with the 
use of partition vectors. The section will 
include tables, graphs and images to 
indicate how the results from the 
blockmodeling analysis can help visualise 
how fragmentation could affect global trade. 
An explanation will also be given to describe 
the results and to make assumptions. A 
comparison will be given based on the 
partition vectors to illustrate the differences 
among the trading blocks. In order to 
provide a better visual representation of the 
NETDRAW networks, Prezi has been used 
to provide visual images along with the 
world map so that the exact names appear 
instead of numbers. In the Appendix, 
hyperlinks and whole images are included. 
4 . 2 . 2  G e o g r a p h i c a l  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  a n a l y s i s -
m e t h o d o l o g y  
Through this analysis, 12 blocks of 
countries have been used, in other words, 
12 geographical locations have been 
identified. This can be seen in Table 2. 
These blocks encompass a mixture of 
standard classification of countries into 
groups according to their geographical 
location, together with a more detailed 
grouping where, for instance USA and 
Canada is taken as one block, according to 
their location. To group the countries, a 
standard classification was used by the 
United Nations’ classification system 
(United Nations, 2012). 
Table 2 - Geographical classification of countries 
1 USA and Canada 
2 Central America 
3 South America 
4 North Africa 
5 Sub-Saharan Africa 
6 EU 
7 Europe 
8 South East Asia 
9 Western Asia/Middle East 
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10 North Asia (Russia and Mongolia) 
11 Australia (New Zealand, New 
Caledonia)  
12 Eastern Asia 
After the analysis was done, using the 
UCINET software, a txt. file was created 
with the blocks. In the txt. file, are reports of 
the densities (in values based on the import 
trade) within and between the blocks and it 
is possible to compare these values with the 
average value. If the values are higher than 
the average, then the blocks are trading 
with each other. If the value is lower than 
the average, then the blocks are not trading 
with each other. Having done the 1/0 matrix 
in Excel, the final image matrix was drawn 
using the NETDRAW software. This image 
matrix can be found in Figure 2. 
As it is seen, block number 1,3,6,8 and 12 
remains trading within themselves, which is 
shown by the loop above the numbers, but 
also trades with other trading blocks.  The 
USA and Canada remain trading partners at 
all times, but also stay in contact with every 
other trading block, except block number 5, 
which is the Sub-Sahara African countries. 
To give exact figures, the USA’s top three 
trading partners include China, Canada and 
Mexico respectively, which is unlikely to 
change for a possible Internet 
fragmentation. 
Table 3 - USA top trading partners, in ’000 dollars 
United_States Germany 110602811,950 
United_States Japan 150401123,350 
United_States Mexico 280017205,620 
United_States Canada 327482229,980 
United_States China 444407150,080 
Trading block number 3, South America will 
trade among their countries, but also 
remains in trade with USA and Canada, and 
Eastern Asia. Countries in the South 
American region mostly trade with the USA 
and China, reporting the highest trading 
values for these countries. 
From the network perspective, number 1 
and number 12 have the highest 
betweenness centrality measure, which 
means that these two blocks are the most 
central players in the network. If we look at 
the trading values of the USA, it is 
understandable that this country trades the 
highest among all the other countries. 
Trading block number 10, which includes 
Russia, has a high degree, which means 
that block number 10 has a high number of 
connections in the network, making Russia 
a key player in the network, similarly to USA 
and Canada. 
It has also been found out, that the Sub 
Sahara African countries have the lowest 
trading values and this block can be 
considered as an isolate in the network. In 
Figure 2- Image matrix geographical location 
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other words, Sub-Saharan Africa countries 
will not affect fragmentation, and 
fragmentation will affect these countries 
positively by increasing their trade with 
other blocks. 
4 . 2 . 3  T r a d i n g  O r g a n i s a t i o n s  
A n a l y s i s  
The second partition vector used is based 
on trading organisation that are global and 
include countries from all around the world. 
Table 4 has all the organisations and the 
different variations. Number 2, 3 and 4 do 
not contain any countries as there is no 
single country that belongs only to the G20, 
APEC and the NAFTA organisation only. 
Countries that belong to one of the 
mentioned organisations belong to other 
trade organisation(s) as well, therefore the 
following groups are the only possible 
variations. Apart from the organisations, it 
has been found out that some countries are 
not part of any of the stated organisation in 
Table 4. These have been labelled as Not 
Applicable. 
Table 4 - Trade organisations – possible variations 
among countries 
1 WTO 
2 G20 
3 APEC 
4 NAFTA 
5 G20, WTO 
6 WTO, APEC 
7 EU, WTO 
8 NAFTA, WTO, APEC 
9 G20, WTO, APEC 
10 NAFTA, G20, WTO, APEC 
11 N/A 
In Figure 3, the network shows how trade 
would be fragmented according to the trade 
organisations. Similarly to the previous 
figure, loops are existent in the network, 
which means that if the Internet fragments, 
then trade will remain or increase in the 
blocks where the loop is visible and these 
are block number 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 (Table 5). 
Countries belonging to these blocks can be 
seen in Table 4. As it is seen, trading blocks 
in this network is highly connected, where 
the blocks, or groups of countries are 
connected to nearly every other group of 
countries.  
 
Figure 3- Image matrix trade organisations 
 Table 5 - Blocks with loops (trading inside the block) 
No. of block Countries Trading organisation 
5 
Argentina Bolivia Brazil Cuba Egypt_Arab_Rep. Guatemala India Nigeria Pakistan Paraguay 
South_Africa Tanzania Uruguay Venezuela Zimbabwe 
G20, WTO 
6 
Australia Brunei Hong_Kong_China Japan Korea_Rep. Malaysia New_Zealand Papua_New_Guinea 
Peru Russian_Federation Singapore Vietnam 
WTO, APEC 
7 
Austria Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus Czech_Republic Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany 
Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Netherlands Poland Portugal 
Romania Slovak_Republic Slovenia Spain Sweden United_Kingdom 
EU, WTO 
8 Canada United_States NAFTA, WTO, APEC 
9 Chile China Indonesia Philippines Thailand G20, WTO, APEC 
 
The most central blocks are number 8 and 
9, in other words Canada and the USA and 
Chile, China, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand. Based on the calculations and 
trade organisations partition vector, it can 
be seen that after fragmentation, the two 
blocks are very likely to trade with each 
other and within the trading block itself. 
Being the most central blocks in the 
network, connecting to every other block 
makes the above mentioned countries 
crucial in trading. 
The second highest central blocks are 
number 5 and 10. Block number 10 includes 
only one country, Mexico, as this is the only 
nation that belongs to four trading 
organisations: NAFTA, G20, WTO, APEC. 
Having a rather active role in the network by 
connecting to six other blocks will only make 
Mexico’s role more important. 
Block number 5 includes countries like 
India, Brazil and South Africa and are also 
considered to have an important role in the 
trading network. On the other hand, 
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numerous countries are not part of any 
trade organisation and these have been 
labelled as N/A (Not Applicable), and which 
is block number 11 As it is seen in Figure 3, 
ties (or connections) are going out both 
ways, from 11 to 8 and 9 and vice versa. In 
other words, countries with no trading 
organisations are having a bilateral trade 
with countries belonging to block number 8 
and 9 (USA and Canada; Chile, China, 
Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand), 
showing an increased trading pattern. There 
is a third connection going towards block 
11, from block 5 (South American 
countries), but it is not a bilateral trade, as 
countries in block number 11 are only 
exporting to the South American countries. 
This means that this link is at risk after a 
possible fragmentation. 
4 . 2 . 4  L a n g u a g e s  A n a l y s i s  
The third partition vector that has been used 
is language. A total of 11 groups have been 
created according to the ten most widely 
used languages on the world, and in 
addition, these languages are the official 
languages used in a specific country. For 
instance, English language is an official 
language in India, but not the primary one. 
This is why only the official and primary 
languages used in countries have been 
included. Otherwise, a group of ‘Others’ has 
been included to indicate languages that are 
not in the ten identified ones. By including a 
language partition vector, it will be seen how 
language can affect the whole trading 
pattern, illustrating how countries would 
trade between each other based on 
language differences. As having debates 
over the different generic top level domain 
names, introducing Cyrillic, Chinese and 
Arabic letters, the language partition vector 
corresponds with this debate. 
Table 6 - Ten most widely used 
languages on the world 
1 Chinese 
2 Spanish 
3 English 
4 Hindi 
5 Arabic 
6 Portuguese 
7 Russian 
8 Japanese 
9 Javanese 
10 Bengali 
11 Others 
In Figure 4, the network of languages is 
shown. Quite interesting to see that the 
network is highly connected, with Chinese 
(1), English (3), Hindi (4) and Japanese (8) 
as the main four languages that are the 
most central in the network. Countries 
belonging to these groups are: Australia, 
Canada, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, 
United Kingdom and United States. On the 
other hand, only three blocks, Spanish (2), 
English (3), and Russian (7) are the only 
ones that will remain trading partners with 
themselves and will trade within the block 
itself. Although Russia is the only country in 
the block, its geographical area is significant 
enough to consider the country trading with 
itself, similarly to that of China. 
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Figure 4 - Image matrix languages 
 
 
4 . 2 . 5  D i s c u s s i o n  
Eugene Kaspersy, the CEO of 
KasperskyLab, have already stated some 
possible scenarios that might happen in the 
future. He notes that  
‘What may prove to be the ultimate game-
changer is the fragmentation of the Internet. A 
number of countries, (…) are considering 
carving out their own sectors of the Internet, or 
may even have already started the process. If 
the trend spreads, which is likely, such 
fragmentation will bring about the creation of 
parallel networks as governments the world over 
try to isolate their critically important 
communications. Such networks with no 
physical connection to the Internet are already 
widely used for military communications.’ 
-Kaspersky, 2013 
As he says, parallel networks are one 
possibility that might happen, not only in the 
military communications, but among 
governments, nations and countries. Even 
though the end user might not see any 
changes, if fragmentation happens on the 
governments and nation levels, but there is 
the possibility that this might not be the 
case. It might be that fragmentation will 
happen at such an extent, that the end user 
will face access restrictions. It might be that 
countries will introduce their own DNS 
system in their own language so that only 
English, French, Spanish or Chinese 
speaking users will be able to access 
content. Another possibility is that the so 
called borderless Internet will become ‘non-
borderless’, operating with borders, and 
those borders might happen according to 
geographical borders, or language borders 
– where people speak the same language. 
There is also an ongoing debate about 
Internet Service Providers (ISP). ISPs have 
the ability to control the available data that 
an end user can use. What is interesting to 
note here is the fact that ISPs are already 
thinking of having a standard plan for a set 
price, and when the user would like to 
access any other content that is not in the 
plan, will be charged at a higher price. This 
is also resulting in the restriction of data flow 
and making the Internet fragmented.  
Regarding this issue, Kaspersky (2013) also 
notes the following: 
‘In some countries, for example Brazil, there's 
talk about forcing global giants such as Google 
and Facebook to locate their data centres locally 
to process local communications. If this trend 
gains worldwide momentum, it will be a disaster 
for global IT giants and pose a threat of full-
blown Balkanisation of the Internet. The process 
would probably foster the creation of local 
search engines; email systems, social networks 
and so on – an intimidating prospect for publicly 
listed companies.’ 
If this happens, the Internet will not remain a 
universal platform that is freely accessible to 
everyone.  
4 . 2 . 6  C o m p a r i s o n  o f  
N e t w o r k s  
After the blockmodelling analysis, 
comparison can be made among the three 
partition vectors, taking the geographical 
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classification as the base network. As a 
starting point, it can be said that if 
fragmentation happens, different countries, 
pairs of countries or a country will trade 
within a defined block. The most salient pair 
of countries are the USA and Canada. Their 
trading relationship will remain at all costs, 
as they use the same language and they 
are also part of the same trade 
organisations. In addition, it has been found 
out that the USA and Canada, and Eastern 
Asia trade with every other blocks in the 
network making these two groups the most 
central in the whole trading network. Only 
one exception is made which is the Sub 
Sahara African block. From the analysis, 
this region is not trading significantly with 
any other block. Central and South America 
and the Australian bocks are only trading 
with Eastern Asia which includes China, and 
with North America. There is a clear 
bilateral trade between the EU countries 
and those countries that are in Europe but 
not part of the EU. In addition, the EU block 
also trades with South East Asia, North Asia 
(Russia) and North Africa, thanks to the 
geographical closeness of each block.  
Again, based on language, countries in 
block number 8 (Chile, China, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Thailand) remains 
trading partners with each other, and based 
on geographical classification, China will 
remain a connection between Chile and the 
rest of the countries mentioned. As these 
countries are in three different geographical 
locations, we can see that South America 
and South East Asia will not trade with each 
other, only with the help of China, as China 
is connected to both blocks. What is seen 
here is that the Japanese, Chinese, English 
and Hindi languages are the ones being the 
most central in the network, having the role 
of brokers who connects every other group 
(languages) together. Although English 
would be the only language trading with 
itself, which means that if fragmentation 
happens then countries with English as the 
official language will trade with each other. 
The trading patterns of African countries 
have not been significant, compared to the 
trading values of European or Asian 
countries. Based on the geographical 
location, South Africa in particular will have 
lost trading links with its partners. After 
fragmentation, it is seen that African 
countries only trade with the USA and 
Canada, and the South East Asian blocks. 
Also, based on language, African countries 
will import and export goods from Russian, 
English, Japanese, Chinese, Hindi and 
Javanese speaking countries. 
European Union countries are trading with 
six different blocks, these are: South East 
Asia, North Asia, USA and Canada, Eastern 
Asia, Europe (including states that are not 
members of the EU) and North Africa 
countries. After the analysis with the trading 
organisation partition vector, European 
Union countries will stay in trade with all the 
blocks identified in Table 4. In other words, 
trading will not change after fragmentation. 
In addition, language would not be a crucial 
indicator either. 
Image 1 Visual representation of countries belonging to groups based on geographical classification (World Bank, 2013) 
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Image 2 Visual representation of countries belonging to groups based on the ten most widely spoken languages (World Bank, 2013) 
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Image 3 Visual representation of countries belonging to groups based on trade organisations (World Bank, 2013) 
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4 . 3  I n t e r n e t  F r a g m e n t a t i o n  a n d  i t s  i n f l u e n c e  o n  g l o b a l  t r a d e  t h r o u g h  i n t e r p r e t i v e  a n a l y s i s  
( E r t i n a  D y r m a )  
 
 
The data derived for this part of the project 
was from interviews from senior officers of 
ICT and trade ministries and departments 
in eight governments (Albania, Brazil, 
Ghana, India, Kenya, Sweden, Turkey and 
UK). Efforts were made to contact   the 
US, Russia and China, but unsuccessfully. 
There are two parts being emphasized: 
the countries’ preparedness for a 
fragmented Internet and its influence on 
global trade. 
There are ongoing discussions regarding 
the change of multistakeholder model 
among recognised key players of Internet 
governance, for example Brazil and China. 
Brazil considers the multistakeholder 
model is the best form of Internet 
governance, stating that Internet should 
serve as a tool for development and that 
the issues of concern to developing 
countries (infrastructure, access, capacity 
building, etc.) should occupy the center of 
international debate. The "NETmundial 
Multistakeholder Statement" reinforced the 
need for the transition process occurs in 
an open, ensuring also the participation of 
actors that are not in the ICANN 
community. 
However, data collected from this study 
shows that other governments feel that 
Internet fragmentation is unlikely to occur, 
particularly based on countries’ inactions 
in preparation for a fragmentation. 
According to other government officials, 
such inactivity signals a de-facto approval 
of the current multistakeholder model.   
India argues that everyone's purpose is to 
have a unified Internet in order to maintain 
the openness and freedom of information 
flow. Despite the fact that Brazil supports 
this statement, they say that its 
governance needs to be more 
independent.  
The developing countries felt that they 
would face increased challenges in 
creating and maintaining their trading 
image and additional barriers would lead 
to increased bureaucracy among trading 
partners leading to higher cost. This 
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provides additional support to maintaining 
the current multistakeholder approach.  
Different point of views of countries 
including here Ghana, Kenya and Albania, 
discuss that even though they do not 
foresee an Internet break up they do 
believe that if in any scenarios this 
assumption takes place, the developing 
countries will be the main ones to suffer 
when it comes to global trade. On the 
contrary, Brazil and Sweden say that 
despite political debates trade won't be 
affected and the reason behind this is that 
business leaders will not stop trading links 
with their partners due to economic 
reasons. A current example is trade 
between Russia and Germany, where 
despite Germany being against Russia’s 
actions in Crimea, Ukraine, business 
connections continue. 
Considering this, it can be concluded that 
the Internet will remain untouched and 
following its current governance structure. 
Most of these key players do not foresee a 
change in Internet governance. Different 
developing level countries support 
different views, where the developed once 
are positive that Internet fragmentation will 
not affect any global trading link and the 
developing countries arguing against by 
string that the strong countries will not face 
any problem due to the fact they have 
already created their trading image and 
are strong enough to overcome any issue 
of this scale. 
Despite the difficulty of reaching to the 
right representative of the countries 
regarding Internet fragmentation and its 
influence upon global (online) trade, some 
significantly potential responses were 
reached. Responses collected from key 
players of the industry and also secondary 
players to reach at a general view of the 
issue, tend to draw one key conclusion: 
Internet fragmentation shall not take place 
and that a multistakeholder governance 
approach needs to take place. 
4 . 3 . 1  C o u n t r i e s ’  
P r e p a r e d n e s s  
‘The strategy of a business is something like 
an airplane, if it does not move forward then it 
will fall off the sky, and it comes even more 
true with the evolution of the Internet. You 
have to have even if you do not have a product 
you can sell over the Internet you should use it 
to your advantages even by the way of 
marketing or by the way of some sort of 
platform’ 
UK representative, 2014 
Developed countries such as UK find 
Internet the key tool of trade development, 
which has helped the all globalisation 
process of opening up the market for 
anybody to trade anywhere. The 
importance of Internet as a catalyser 
towards globalisation is noticed and 
supported by all the countries. However, 
there are concerns associate to the 
Internet evolution as well.  
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The main concern that Turkey worries 
about is the Cyber security of the users in 
conducting global business. Considering 
this, they support Internet fragmentation to 
a certain degree. While Albania argues 
that a fragmented Internet in this stage of 
their development, where they are trying to 
reach out for transparency sharing their 
activities and policies online, it is not 
helpful for the government. In addition, 
Kenya is using Internet openness for the 
same reason, arguing that a fragmented 
Internet would lead to restrictions for other 
countries and businesses to reach out for 
information for their country.  
On one hand countries such as Turkey 
and India state that they are prepared for a 
fragmented Internet and support the idea 
that countries ‘have to provide the cyber 
security for itself, its citizens and the 
companies, but for sure the fragmentation 
has to enable smooth online trading’ 
(Turkey representative). On the other 
hand, Sweden argues that there are so 
many different aspects of the 
fragmentation in different ways that it is 
difficult to determine the Internet 
fragmentation effects.  
To conclude, it is important to say that 
despite the fact that countries refuse to 
give information of certain actions being 
taken by their governments, they claimed 
that preparing for the worst is strategic for 
each country.   
4 . 3 . 2  I n t e r n e t  F r a g m e n t a t i o n  
I m p a c t  o n  O n l i n e  T r a d e    
A different story emerges with regard to 
global trade. Different views were 
expressed that seem to be linked to the 
country level of development. Developed 
countries felt that Internet fragmentation 
would not affect global trading links, 
because economic growth and global 
business would be prioritised.  
Developed countries such as UK are more 
concerned with the side effects that a 
fragmented Internet would bring, including 
‘difficulties to access information, to share 
it, to have that globalisation; and you get 
to come back to much more fragmented 
market, so leads in more bureaucracy and 
slowing everything down and thereby 
more costs’ (UK representative). While 
developing countries such as Ghana and 
Kenya point out the cultural flow issues 
and the limitation of knowledge and 
expertise regarding to global trade, 
present both pros and cons to 
fragmentation.  
Emerging economies, for example India, 
argue that a multiple Internet ‘might create 
boundaries between nations which will 
hinder the online trading, though few 
countries believe it as a major concern but 
Internet fragmentation might hinder the 
online trade drastically.’ However, Turkey 
states that as time passes and as long as 
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solutions are produced the trading would 
recover from the effects of the fragmented 
Internet.  
 
 
‘Trade is not very sentimental about politics 
sometimes. The traders will want to keep up 
the trade, for instance the relationship with 
Russia and Germany. It should have been 
cooled down but the companies do not will to 
do that, they would want to keep up trade even 
with Internet fragmentation. But the trade 
between partners will be a glow; will be strong 
interest to keep the trade up. the lack of new 
trade, new innovative exchanges and 
continues development, it would stall in the 
situation we have today, not continue to 
develop rather than retract, trying forces to 
keep it up.’ 
Sweden representative, 2014 
Different issues of Internet fragmentation 
were raised through the data collection 
with the representatives, providing a closer 
insight of the issue in country level that 
may be available through written literature 
already. 
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4 . 4  A s s e s s i n g  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  i n t e r n e t  f r a g m e n t a t i o n  o n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  b u s i n e s s  o p e r a t i o n s   
( L a k m a l  L i y a n a g e )  
In this section a comprehensive analysis 
of companies based on their 
organisational structure is carried out. 
Here we try to identify the relationship 
between the structure of companies and 
the impact of fragmentation on this 
relationship. An analysis is carried out on 
features of organisations such as the risk 
associated with the industry of the parent 
company, the industries diversification of 
the subsidiaries and also the location of 
the subsidiaries.  
4 . 4 . 1  G l o b a l  c o m p a n y  s t r u c t u r e  
Table 7 - Data from  Global  Companies 
 
Company name Core RISK 
Industry Based W 
Average 
Location Based W 
Average 
Core + weighted 
industry 
Overall Risk 
VODAFONE GROUP PUBLIC 
LIMITED COMPANY 
5 4.652 1.795 9.652 11.447 
BHP BILLITON PLC 2 3.800 2.333 5.800 8.133 
GLENCORE XSTRATA PLC 2 3.167 2.800 5.167 7.967 
RIO TINTO PLC 2 3.835 1.816 5.835 7.651 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC 2 3.817 1.512 5.817 7.329 
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Table 7 above displays Global companies 
ranked by their overall risk. As shown, 
Vodafone has the highest overall risk with 
a score of 11.447 whereas Royal Dutch 
Shell PLC has the lowest at 7.329. On 
close inspection we see that the industry 
that Vodafone operates under, in both the 
parent company and the subsidiaries’ 
distribution, is at the highest risk of all 
global companies, with a risk score of 5 
and 4.652 respectively. This is in contrast 
to the score by Royal Dutch Shell PLC for 
example which has a parent (core) risk of 
2 and an industry based average of 3.817. 
Interestingly, Vodafone’s location based 
score is one of the lowest for Global 
companies at 1.795 while Glencore 
Xstrata PLC has the highest score of 
2.800. This warranted further inspection of 
Vodafone’s subsidiaries given that its 
overall risk is so high. 
For further analysis, the wheel (Figure 5) 
was redrawn to examine the risk 
associated with the location distribution of 
Vodafone’s subsidiaries. 66% of 
subsidiaries are based in countries with 
lowest e-Friction which has thus had an 
impact on the total location based score 
that Vodafone has received (1.795). Here 
we can begin to understand that assessing 
effects of fragmentation by just looking at 
the locations where companies operate is 
not sufficient. In order to overcome this 
and give a better understanding of how a 
company would be affected by 
fragmentation the distribution of 
subsidiaries across industries are also 
incorporated. In the case of Vodafone, 
there are no subsidiaries operating in 
industries 0,1,2,3 which are essentially 
considered as low risk industries (with 
Figure 5 - Vodafone Location Diversification 
L e v e l  o f  
R i s k  
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respect to Internet fragmentation based on 
their primary stages of the production 
process). Vodafone has most of its 
subsidiaries in industry 4 which is related 
to ‘communications’ and that would be a 
highly affected industry if fragmentation 
was to occur. The next significant portions 
of subsidiaries for Vodafone are within 
industries 7 & 8, namely ‘finance & 
insurance’ and ‘services,’ which are again 
also highly affected industries if 
fragmentation was to occur. In essence, 
225 subsidiaries (92%) of Vodafone’s 244 
subsidiaries are operational in industries 
that are more susceptible for risk if 
fragmentation was to occur. This then 
presents logic as to why despite Vodafone 
having a low location based average 
score, its overall risk score is high as it has 
been positively impacted by industry 
average 
F i g u r e  6  -  S u m m a r y  o f  e f f e c t s  o n  V o d a f o n e  
 
Level of 
Friction 
Industry Classifications 
% on 
location 
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1  8 2  1  1  3 8  3 9  1  
6 7 %  
2 3  8  1  
 
8  6  
 1 1 %  
3 1  8  1  2  1  5  
 7 %  
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T a b l e  8  -  D a t a  f r o m  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o m p a n i e s  
Company name Core RISK 
Industry Based W 
Average 
Location Based W 
Average 
Core + weighted 
industry 
Overall Risk 
COMPASS GROUP PLC 5 4.649 1.514 9.649 11.163 
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP PLC 5 4.123 1.154 9.123 10.277 
BRITISH SKY BROADCASTING 
GROUP PLC 
5 4.231 1.015 9.231 10.246 
ITV PLC 5 4.127 1.101 9.127 10.228 
WM MORRISON SUPERMARKETS PLC 5 3.892 1.000 8.892 9.892 
 
Table above (Table 8) shows a set of 
International companies based on their 
overall risk ranking. Compass Group PLC 
has the highest risk of 11.163 while WM 
Morrison Supermarkets PLC has the 
lowest risk value (9.892). All companies 
have the same core risk score of 5; a 
score based on the industry the parent 
company operates under. What 
differentiates the companies is the industry 
based and location based average scores. 
Although quite similar amongst the 
companies, Compass has the highest 
score in both categories: 4.649 and 1.514 
respectively. Morrison and British Sky 
Broadcasting Group PLC have a 
significantly low location based average as 
all of their subsidiaries are located in lower 
e-Friction countries. With regards to 
Compass, 69% of its subsidiaries are 
located in countries with low e-Friction 
ratings and only 3% are located in 
countries associated with high e-Friction. 
Therefore, location itself will seemingly 
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have a low impact on the company under 
cases of fragmentation.  
From the chart and the accompanying 
table below we can see that a high portion 
of subsidiaries operate within ‘retail trade’ 
(131), ‘services’ (79) and ‘finance & 
services’ (65), which cumulatively account 
for 95% of Compass’ subsidiaries. Such 
industry sectors are related to medium-
high and high risk levels. This validates 
Compass’ high industry based average of 
4.649. Despite a larger percentage of 
companies located in low e-Friction 
countries, more of these subsidiaries are 
related to industries with high risk levels. 
Therefore, such operations are considered 
to be highly vulnerable to the drawbacks of 
fragmentation 
  
Figure 7 - Compass Location Diversification 
T h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  G r e e n w i c h ,  B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l  5 1  
 
 
 
Level of 
friction 
Industry Classifications 
Total 
0 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 
 
2 1 4 95 58 53 213 
2 
 
2 
 
1 18 4 9 34 
3 
    
7 2 3 12 
4 1 
  
2 10 1 12 26 
5 
    
1 
 
2 3 
Total 1 4 1 7 131 65 79 288 
  
T h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  G r e e n w i c h ,  B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l  5 2  
4 . 4 . 3  T r a n s n a t i o n a l  c o m p a n y  s t r u c t u r e  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Out of the following ranked transnational 
companies, HSBC Holdings PLC presents 
with the highest overall risk of 10.860 and 
Astrazeneca PLC has the lowest risk of 
9.847. The companies all have a medium-
high core risk rating based on the parent 
industry. International Consolidated 
Airlines Group has an industry based 
average of 4.259, the highest of all 
companies analysed. HSBC falls third on 
this category and Astrazeneca has the 
lowest of scores (3.892). In terms of 
location based score, Unilever PLC has 
the highest rating (2.196) and International 
consolidated Airlines Group has the lowest 
rating (1.429).  
T a b l e  9 -  D a t a  f r o m  T r a n s n a t i o n a l  C o m p a n i e s  
Company name 
Core 
RISK 
Industry Based W 
Average 
Location Based W 
Average 
Core + weighted 
industry 
Overall Risk 
HSBC HOLDINGS PLC 5 4.051 1.808 9.051 10.860 
INTERNATIONAL CONSOLIDATED AIRLINES 
GROUP S.A. 
5 4.259 1.429 9.259 10.688 
UNILEVER PLC 4 4.178 2.196 8.178 10.374 
GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC 4 3.901 2.066 7.901 9.967 
ASTRAZENECA PLC 4 3.892 1.955 7.892 9.847 
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HSBC has a relatively low location based 
average score (1.808). On analysis, HSBC 
have situated 70% of their subsidiaries in 
countries of low e-friction. Therefore, it 
appears that location itself will be at a 
relatively low risk of impact should 
fragmentation occur. The breakdown of 
HSBC’s subsidiaries in terms of industry 
reveals that 578 (30% subsidiaries fall 
under ‘manufacturing’ and 451 (23%) 
subsidiaries under ‘finance and insurance.’ 
A substantial portion of subsidiaries (15%) 
are related to the industry sector of 
‘services.’ These industry categories are in 
turn associated with medium-high and 
high risk levels, thereby presenting HSBC 
with a high industry based average rating. 
As previously mentioned, two other 
transnational companies had an average 
industry rating higher than HSBS however, 
combined with its core risk and location 
based average, HSBC was presented with 
the highest overall risk. A substantial 
portion of HSBC’s subsidiaries operate 
under industry sectors that are most 
vulnerable to the risks of fragmentation. 
Going by industry risk itself, HSBC are in a 
position to be strongly affected by 
fragmentation factors.   
Figure 8- HSBC location Diversification 
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Companies listed above (Table 10) are 
multinational companies based on overall 
risk in case that fragmentation should occur. 
As the table shows Prudential Plc would be 
highly affected with an overall risk of 
11.006. One of the main reasons behind 
this is in the industry based average 
especially because the company operates 
in the Finance and Insurance sector.  
Prudential PLC has 66% of their 
subsidiaries in locations where there is less 
“e-friction” it seems logical due to the 
company operating in a highly technology 
oriented industry. BP’s core industry falls 
under manufacturing hence the subsidiary 
score is lesser than the other companies. 
 
T a b l e  1 0 -  D a t a  f r o m  M u l t i n a t i o n a l  C o m p a n i e s  
Company name 
Core 
RISK 
Industry Based W 
Average 
Location Based W 
Average 
Core + weighted 
industry 
Overall Risk 
PRUDENTIAL PLC 5 4.151 1.855 9.151 11.006 
TESCO PLC 5 4.237 1.374 9.237 10.611 
BARCLAYS PLC 5 4.124 1.313 9.124 10.438 
CRH PUBLIC LIMITED 
COMPANY 
4 3.471 1.640 7.471 9.110 
BP PLC 4 3.800 1.063 7.800 8.863 
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As it can be seen in the graph most of the 
subsidiaries are located in the industries 
that are in ‘high’ or ‘medium to high’ areas. 
This since the company is a multinational 
company they localise their operations in 
operating regions which can also be seen in 
the industry diversification chart. 
By looking at the industries that subsidiaries 
operate in 56% of subsidiaries operate in 
industries related to Manufacturing (3) and 
finance and insurance (7). This is one of the 
key reasons behind why Prudential Plc has 
a high weighted industry based risk value in 
comparison with other multinational 
companies.  
 
Figure 10- Prudential Location Diversification vs Industry Diversification 
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The impact that the Internet has on daily 
activities of everybody’s life changed the 
way people communicate and do 
business. Sharing information and 
knowledge, with an ease of access, 
brought a revolutionary development into 
the society. The ongoing discussion on a 
possible Internet fragmentation would lead 
to the breakdown of the Internet freedom 
especially in the authoritarian regimes. 
Different nations and companies will get a 
tighter control on how and how much 
information people will get access to. 
Therefore, the main loser will be the 
Internet users, as nations will step up their 
level of censorship and punishment 
against freedom of speech. The 
developing world, however, will struggle 
even more to catch up with the developed 
countries, which more likely will find a way 
around Internet fragmentation. With more 
resources and knowledge, the developing 
countries will be more affected than the 
developed countries. Furthermore, the 
digital gap will increase, where women will 
be the biggest losers of the Internet 
fragmentation. It will be harder for them to 
improve their income and education, as 
well as it will get harder to overcome the 
barriers of discrimination against women 
and their education.  
With a fragmented Internet another story 
emerges regarding global trade. This 
research demonstrates that offline trading 
links among countries will not be affected 
in ten years and the links among 
countries, in the worst scenario, will stay 
the same or slightly reduce, but will not be 
eliminated totally. The USA and Canada 
and the Eastern Asian countries are the 
main players in the network having trade 
connections with every other blocks, and 
their links will not change after applying 
the partition vectors. European Union 
countries trade with the eastern part of 
Asia along with Russia, the USA and 
Canada and the rest of the European 
countries and North Sahara. 
Interestingly, according to the analysis, 
Sub Sahara African countries show no 
offline trade links with any trading blocks. 
It is seen that these countries are 
increasingly engaged in offline trading 
activities based on the different partitions. 
After the analysis, some links in the 
African countries are reduced, but the 
5 .  CONCLUSION 
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main offline trading connections stay the 
same for the time being. In addition, some 
countries are offline trading with 
themselves, like Russia and China, taking 
into consideration their geographical area, 
which makes it possible to trade with 
different parts in the same country. Offline 
trading with Russia would increase after a 
possible fragmentation as more countries 
would trade with it. It was also seen, that 
other blocks are trading within the block 
itself, like USA and Canada and the 
European Union for instance.  
On the other side of the discussions, a 
multiple Internet is argued to have a 
significant effect in terms of online trade. 
Developing countries, including African 
countries (including Kenya) and European 
countries (for example Albania) worry 
about the potential of Internet 
fragmentation and what impact would 
have on their GDP growth as well as their 
cultural development. Having said that, 
developed countries seem more positive in 
regard to the influence of a multiple 
Internet on global trade (online trade). 
Countries from both levels of 
development, such as Sweden and Turkey 
argue that, although a possible Internet 
fragmentation is unlikely to occur, its 
negative side of influence would diminish 
as solutions evolved.  
Finally, this research showed the impact of 
the fragmented Internet on business level. 
Essentially understating the impact of 
fragmentation on FTSE100 companies, all 
companies would be relatively affected 
due to the international nature of business 
operations. However, the extent of this 
effect is strongly influenced by the industry 
of operation; not only of the parent 
company but also of the industry 
diversification of the subsidiaries. Each 
company is therefore in a unique position 
to be affected by fragmentation. 
There was no particular relationship 
observed between the typology of these 
companies and the risk associated with 
fragmentation. This disproves the 
hypothesis that company structure can be 
attributed to different risks under 
fragmentation. This suggests that, given 
the fact that these organisations operate in 
highly complex networks, business 
strategy alone  or location alone are not 
enough to determine what risk companies 
would face. One factor that was interesting 
however was concerned with the 
relationship between parent companies 
and their subsidiaries. As business 
strategy dictates the nature of this 
relationship and the nature of operations, 
unique vulnerabilities are generated within. 
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Essentially, the communication efforts 
between the parent and the subsidiaries 
are susceptible to the effects of a 
fragmented internet. 
These are novel findings that raise 
practical implications about the potential 
vulnerability of a company under a 
fragmented internet. As the e-Friction 
Model alone does not provide a complete 
picture of the effects of fragmentation, 
there are still further research  to be made. 
These insights will prove invaluable to our 
understanding of how risks associated 
with a fragmented internet can impact on 
companies operating on a global scale. 
Regarding the blockmodel analysis, a 
possible fragmentation would not have a 
negative effect on the offline trading 
patterns. Even though, offline trade is not 
affected, the situation with online trade 
might be different. Regarding next steps, if 
online trade data becomes available, this 
now and innovative tool used for the 
analysis can be done again in the future. 
Various findings and results are drawn 
from this research regarding the impact of 
a fragmented Internet on different 
economic, social and political aspects. 
Despite the numerous discussions on 
international conferences and summits, 
the multistakeholder model seems to be 
the most strategic solution to the future of 
the Internet governance, where the 
interests of all the stakeholders are met 
and taken into consideration for 
sustainable future decisions and policy 
frameworks.  
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7 . 1  M e t h o d o l o g y  f o r  A n  
a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  
a n d  p o l i t i c a l  e f f e c t s  o f  
f r a g m e n t a t i o n  
The analysis focuses on discourse data in 
social and political forums, such as 
debates, speeches, and hearings of the 
phenomenon of Internet governance, 
security, censorship and digital inequality. 
The reason for focusing on these topics is 
because these are the topics, which will 
make it possible for the researcher to get a 
speculative look into the future. Thus, 
enabling to come to conclusions on the 
discourse of the texts in terms of what is 
being discussed the most as the literature 
on discourse analysis suggest that 
language discourse overtime becomes the 
reality or the practice, such analysis will 
enable the researcher to speculate about 
the future, therefore coming to conclusions 
about who wins or loses under DNS 
fragmentation. 
Due to the fact that the secondary data is 
based on debates, speeches and hearings 
the data are not likely to be published in 
databases or other academic archives. For 
the research to be reliable and valid there 
have been extensive consideration to 
identifying the credibility of the data. The 
stakeholder and the data will therefore be 
carefully chosen .The data is therefore 
mostly collected from the EU-database, 
press releases, government websites, and 
credible news forums. However, some of 
the data is collected from personal Twitter 
accounts, thus from reliable stakeholders.  
When interrogating the data, the discourse 
content will be divided into topics, where 
each topic is presented and followed by 
text quotes of the different stakeholders 
opinion about the topic. Furthermore the 
unit of the data will be analysed and 
identified and discussed in the end of each 
topic. When drawing conclusion the topics 
will be drawn together to discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages for each 
topic in order to speculate how the future 
for the DNS Fragmentation will look like 
and to distinguish social and political 
impact of DNS Fragmentation.  
7 .  AP P E N D I X  1  –  
D e t a i l e d  
M et h o d o l o g y  
T h e  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  G r e e n w i c h ,  B u s i n e s s  S c h o o l  6 8  
7 . 2  M e t h o d o l o g y  f o r :  A n  
a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  
f r a g m e n t a t i o n  o n  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  
t h r o u g h  b l o c k m o d e l i n g  
Two different processes will be used to 
successfully undertake the simulation. 
First, business network analysis will help 
to introduce the whole offline trading 
networks between countries. Second, 
blockmodeling analysis will help in the 
grouping of countries with similar 
characteristics, providing a deeper insight 
into the trading patterns. By using partition 
vectors based on different criteria, partition 
vectors will help to create the simulation 
itself. Smith and White (1992) explain what 
is blockmodeling (p.859) 
“A blockmodel of relations between 
positions (blocks) can be characterized in 
terms of aggregate relationships between 
countries in the respective blocks or 
positions. Blockmodeling, as the principal 
method for the network analysis of 
positions, consists of two steps: the 
blocking or clustering of factors on the 
basis of patterns in their network ties, and 
the description of aggregate relations 
between the positions or blocks.” 
Blockmodeling is clustering or grouping 
those individuals in the network that are 
equivalent or have similar attributes. This 
analysis helps to interpret unstructured 
networks to transform into structural ones. 
The reason for using blockmodelling is 
because this analysis focuses the 
researcher’s attention on the overall 
patterns of the network, and as Gerlach 
(1992, p.119) notes, ‘subsets of actors 
within the network (blocks) are determined 
based on the similarity of their 
relationships with the actors in other 
blocks, regardless of the presence or 
absence of ties directly among 
themselves.’ 
A so called partition vector has been used, 
to illustrate and create different scenarios. 
These partition vectors are based on 
geographical classifications of countries 
because it will be interesting to see how 
countries will be partitioned according to 
their geographical location. The second 
partition vector is based on trade 
organisation, as different countries are 
part of the most important and biggest 
trade organisations, and to see how 
countries are grouped together according 
to their belongings to one or more 
organisation. The third partition vector is 
based on language. Here, the ten most 
widely used languages have been taken 
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into account and to see how language can 
fragment trade between countries.  
7 . 3  M e t h o d o l o g y  f o r :  
I n t e r n e t  F r a g m e n t a t i o n  
a n d  i t s  i n f l u e n c e  o n  
g l o b a l  t r a d e  t h r o u g h  
i n t e r p r e t i v e  a n a l y s i s   
The purpose of this methodology is to 
explain the methods used in this part of 
the research project and to justify the 
reasons, limitations and the reliability of 
the data used where primary data is used 
as the main tool of data collection. In order 
to get an in-depth understanding on how 
DNS Fragmentation would affect the 
relationship between countries interpretive 
analysis is used. 
Interpretive analysis allows the researcher 
to identify the most critical interpretive 
elements of data gathered. The benefit of 
which gives the possibility to see and 
understand the main context of why the 
decisions and actions are made; although, 
there is still the difficulty of generalising to 
a larger population.  
Due to the speculative nature of the 
research, interviews between the main 
countries are analysed and compared, to 
obtain data to answer the research 
questions and to meet the objectives, by 
providing an understanding of what the 
fragmentation could do to the trading 
relationship with countries. Selection of the 
countries is based on judgmental sampling 
method due to the fact that the research 
focuses on the main international players 
of Internet governance and global trading. 
This type of probability sampling provides 
close measurement to outreach a strong 
conclusion.   
Data collection starts with looking at public 
data available on the Internet through the 
university’s access to a wide range of 
databases, journals, books and e-books, 
country profiles and publications. The 
primary data are mainly collected in 
London, UK through Skype and call 
conferences with governmental officials of 
the countries selected for this research. 
Given the importance of the sensitive 
information the client are providing and the 
importance of ethics for the conduct of the 
project, it is taken full responsibility of 
storage of the information. Confidential 
information is protected and respected. It 
is also important to strive that it is not on 
researchers’’ intention to fabricate and 
misrepresent data. The study has 
objective nature, with no personal interest 
that can affect the study. In addition, the 
research is also signing a non-disclosure 
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form and an ethical form with University of 
Greenwich, where serious consideration to 
ethical issues such as: age, difficulties on 
understanding the topic, disability, 
confidentiality and anonymous concerns, 
are taken in consideration, in accordance 
to University of Greenwich policy. 
7 . 4  M e t h o d o l o g y  f o r :  
A s s e s s i n g  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  
I n t e r n e t  f r a g m e n t a t i o n  
o n  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
b u s i n e s s  o p e r a t i o n s .  
The present research sought to identify 
how companies that engage in electronic 
commerce would be affected in a scenario 
where Internet fragmentation occurs.  
In order to execute this, the largest 
companies in the UK would need to be 
sampled. To that effect, the FTSE100 
Index was considered a suitable sample 
as it consists of the largest companies 
based on issued shares (Stevenson, 
2012). The FTSE 100 index had been 
selected assuming that the effects of 
fragmentation would have a greater impact 
on companies operating internationally. 
Multinational firms rely heavily on the 
Internet for communication with and 
between subsidiaries and to gain 
competitive advantage via a global supply 
chain. Due to these reasons, 
fragmentation will have a significant 
impact on companies operating 
internationally. 
Secondary data of the FTSE100 was 
gathered from the Orbis database and 
exported into Excel. The information 
deemed most suitable for analysis 
included the industry that company 
operated in, region of business activity and 
industry operations of subsidiaries.  
The first part of the project will theorise on 
how companies in different industries will 
be affected in a scenario where the global 
Internet is fragmented. The effect of this 
fragmented Internet is identified based on 
the global operational strategy of these 
companies and information related to their 
subsidiaries. The key to understand such 
corporations is to recognise and evaluate 
the organisational strategies underpinning 
the business itself and the structure 
employed. 
The 100 companies were categorised into 
one of the four MNE strategies as 
identified by Bartlett and Ghoshal (2002): 
International, Global, Multinational and 
Transnational. To execute this, a thorough 
analysis was carried out of each 
company’s most recently available annual 
report to help pinpoint what strategy the 
company adhered to. In particular, 
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sections related to the company vision, 
mission, business strategy and business 
model were analysed. In the instance that 
the annual report provided insufficient 
information, the company profile found on 
the organisation’s website was examined. 
This information can generally be found in 
the investor relations sections in the 
company corporate website.  
To allow for identification, Bartlett and 
Ghoshal's (2002) typology chart was used 
in order to categorise each company. A 
company would fulfil the criteria of 
employing a specific strategy if it met all 
three requirements. The final sample used 
for the presented study consisted of 20 
FTSE100 companies, 5 from each 
typological category.  
The effects of fragmentation are then 
measured by creating a link between the 
strategies that a company follows and how 
a closed and fragmented Internet would 
affect those business activities. Where 
companies follow a strategy where power 
is decentralised effects of fragmentation is 
considered to be lower. Where companies 
are following a centralised structure where 
most of the decision making is done 
through the head office the effects of 
fragmentation is high. 
Next, the information gathered through 
Orbis about the FTSE100 companies was 
used to extract specific data regarding the 
number of subsidiaries, the industry the 
parent company and the subsidiaries 
operated within, the countries these 
subsidiaries were located and the 
distribution of the subsidiaries. This 
information was generated for the finalised 
sample.  
Using this raw data, a ‘core’ risk value was 
determined based on the companies’ 
industry and a weighted average based on 
a risk value associated with the 
subsidiaries’ industries and their locations 
was calculated. These values were then 
combined to present a ‘total risk value’ 
which allowed for company analysis within 
each typology category.  
The table below contains description of 
industries and the level of risk associated 
with each of the distinct industries. The 
level of risk is scored based on the primary 
stages of its production process and its 
dependence on the internet to operate 
effectively and efficiently. 
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US SIC RISK TABLE 
CODE Description Risk Level 
0 Agriculture, Forestry, And Fishing Low 1 
1 Mining Low-Medium 2 
2 Construction Low 1 
3 Manufacturing Medium-High 4 
4 Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas High 5 
5 Wholesale Trade Medium 3 
6 Retail Trade High 5 
7 Finance, Insurance, And Real Estate High 5 
8 Services Med-High 4 
9 Public Administration Low 1 
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CountryName Intern. Org. Geographical class. Language 
Afghanistan 11 N/A 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Albania 1 WTO 7 Europe 11 Others 
Algeria 11 N/A 4 North Africa 5 Arabic 
Andorra 11 N/A 7 Europe 11 Others 
Anguilla 11 N/A 2 Central America 11 Others 
Antigua And Barbuda 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
Argentina 5 G20, WTO 3 South America 2 Spanish 
Armenia 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Aruba 11 N/A 2 Central America 11 Others 
Australia 6 WTO, APEC 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 3 English 
Austria 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Azerbaijan 11 N/A 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Bahamas, The 11 N/A 2 Central America 11 Others 
Bahrain 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Bangladesh 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 10 Bengali 
Barbados 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
8 .  AP P E N D I X  2  -  
C o u n t r y 
c l a ss i f i ca t i o ns  
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Belarus 11 N/A 7 Europe 7 Russian 
Belgium 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Belize 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
Benin 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Bermuda 11 N/A 2 Central America 11 Others 
Bhutan 11 N/A 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Bolivia 5 G20, WTO 3 South America 2 Spanish 
Bosnia And Herzegovina 11 N/A 7 Europe 11 Others 
Botswana 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Brazil 5 G20, WTO 3 South America 6 Portuguese 
Brunei 6 WTO, APEC 8 South East Asia 11 Others 
Bulgaria 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Burkina Faso 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Burundi 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Cambodia 1 WTO 8 South East Asia 11 Others 
Cameroon 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Canada 8 NAFTA, WTO, APEC 1 USA and Canada 3 English 
Cape Verde 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 6 Portuguese 
Central African Republic 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Chad 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Chile 9 G20, WTO, APEC 3 South America 2 Spanish 
China 9 G20, WTO, APEC 12 Eastern Asia 1 Chinese 
Colombia 1 WTO 3 South America 2 Spanish 
Comoros 11 N/A 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Congo 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Cook Islands 11 N/A 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 11 Others 
Costa Rica 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
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Cote d'Ivoire 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Croatia 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Cuba 5 G20, WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
Cyprus 7 EU, WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Czech Republic 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Denmark 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Djibouti 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Dominica 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
Dominican Republic 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
East Timor 11 N/A 8 South East Asia 6 Portuguese 
Ecuador 1 WTO 3 South America 2 Spanish 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 5 G20, WTO 4 North Africa 5 Arabic 
El Salvador 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
Eritrea 11 N/A 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Estonia 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Ethiopia(excludes Eritrea) 11 N/A 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Faroe Islands 11 N/A 7 Europe 11 Others 
Fiji 1 WTO 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 11 Others 
Finland 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
France 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
French Guiana 11 N/A 3 South America 11 Others 
French Polynesia 11 N/A 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 11 Others 
Gabon 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Gambia, The 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Georgia 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Germany 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Ghana 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
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Greece 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Greenland 11 N/A 1 USA and Canada 11 Others 
Grenada 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
Guadeloupe 11 N/A 2 Central America 11 Others 
Guatemala 5 G20, WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
Guinea 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Guinea-Bissau 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 6 Portuguese 
Guyana 1 WTO 3 South America 11 Others 
Honduras 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
Hong Kong, China 6 WTO, APEC 12 Eastern Asia 11 Others 
Hungary 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Iceland 1 WTO 7 Europe 11 Others 
India 5 G20, WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 4 Hindi 
Indonesia 9 G20, WTO, APEC 8 South East Asia 9 Javanese 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 11 N/A 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Ireland 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Israel 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Italy 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Jamaica 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
Japan 6 WTO, APEC 12 Eastern Asia 8 Japanese 
Jordan 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 5 Arabic 
Kazakhstan 11 N/A 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Kenya 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Kiribati 11 N/A 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 11 Others 
Korea, Republic Of (South) 6 WTO, APEC 12 Eastern Asia 11 Others 
Kuwait 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 5 Arabic 
Kyrgyzstan 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
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Latvia 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Lebanon 11 N/A 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Lesotho 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Libya 11 N/A 4 North Africa 5 Arabic 
Lithuania 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Luxembourg 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Macao 1 WTO 12 Eastern Asia 11 Others 
Macedonia, FYR 1 WTO 7 Europe 11 Others 
Madagascar 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Malawi 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Malaysia 6 WTO, APEC 8 South East Asia 11 Others 
Maldives 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Mali 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Malta 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Martinique 11 N/A 2 Central America 11 Others 
Mauritania 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 5 Arabic 
Mauritius 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Mayotte 11 N/A 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Mexico 10 
NAFTA, G20, WTO, 
APEC 
2 Central America 11 Others 
Moldova 1 WTO 7 Europe 11 Others 
Mongolia 1 WTO 10 North Asia (Russia+Mongolia) 11 Others 
Montenegro 1 WTO 7 Europe 11 Others 
Montserrat 11 N/A 2 Central America 11 Others 
Morocco 1 WTO 4 North Africa 11 Others 
Mozambique 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 6 Portuguese 
Myanmar 1 WTO 8 South East Asia 11 Others 
Namibia 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
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Nepal 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Netherlands 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Netherlands Antilles 11 N/A 2 Central America 11 Others 
New Caledonia 11 N/A 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 9 Javanese 
New Zealand 6 WTO, APEC 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 3 English 
Nicaragua 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
Niger 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Nigeria 5 G20, WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Norway 1 WTO 7 Europe 11 Others 
Occ.Pal.Terr 11 N/A 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Oman 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 5 Arabic 
Other Asia, nes 11 N/A 12 Eastern Asia 11 Others 
Pakistan 5 G20, WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Palau 11 N/A 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 11 Others 
Panama 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
Papua New Guinea 6 WTO, APEC 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 11 Others 
Paraguay 5 G20, WTO 3 South America 2 Spanish 
Peru 6 WTO, APEC 3 South America 2 Spanish 
Philippines 9 G20, WTO, APEC 8 South East Asia 11 Others 
Poland 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Portugal 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 6 Portuguese 
Qatar 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Reunion 11 N/A 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Romania 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Russian Federation 6 WTO, APEC 10 North Asia (Russia+Mongolia) 7 Russian 
Rwanda 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Samoa 1 WTO 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 11 Others 
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Sao Tome And Principe 11 N/A 5 Sub Sahara 6 Portuguese 
Saudi Arabia 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 5 Arabic 
Senegal 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Seychelles 11 N/A 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Sierra Leone 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Singapore 6 WTO, APEC 8 South East Asia 11 Others 
Slovak Republic 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Slovenia 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Solomon Islands 1 WTO 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 11 Others 
South Africa 5 G20, WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Spain 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 2 Spanish 
Sri Lanka 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
St. Kitts and Nevis 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
St. Lucia 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
Sudan 11 N/A 4 North Africa 11 Others 
Suriname 1 WTO 3 South America 9 Javanese 
Swaziland 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Sweden 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 11 Others 
Switzerland 1 WTO 7 Europe 11 Others 
Syrian Arab Republic 11 N/A 9 Western Asia/Middle East 5 Arabic 
Tanzania 5 G20, WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Thailand 9 G20, WTO, APEC 8 South East Asia 11 Others 
Togo 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Tonga 1 WTO 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 11 Others 
Trinidad And Tobago 1 WTO 2 Central America 11 Others 
Tunisia 1 WTO 4 North Africa 5 Arabic 
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Turkey 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Turkmenistan 11 N/A 9 Western Asia/Middle East 11 Others 
Turks and Caicos Isl. 11 N/A 2 Central America 11 Others 
Tuvalu 11 N/A 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 11 Others 
Uganda 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Ukraine 1 WTO 7 Europe 7 Russian 
United Arab Emirates 1 WTO 9 Western Asia/Middle East 5 Arabic 
United Kingdom 7 EU, WTO 6 EU 3 English 
United States 8 NAFTA, WTO, APEC 1 USA and Canada 3 English 
Uruguay 5 G20, WTO 3 South America 2 Spanish 
Vanuatu 1 WTO 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 11 Others 
Venezuela 5 G20, WTO 3 South America 2 Spanish 
Vietnam 6 WTO, APEC 8 South East Asia 11 Others 
Wallis And Futuna 11 N/A 11 Australia (New Zealand, New Caledonia) 11 Others 
Yemen 11 N/A 9 Western Asia/Middle East 5 Arabic 
Zambia 1 WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
Zimbabwe 5 G20, WTO 5 Sub Sahara 11 Others 
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